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FOREWORD 
The public provision of urban facilities and services often takes the fonn of a few 
central supply points serving a large number of spatially dispersed demand points : for 
example, hospitals, schools, libraries, and emergency services such as fire and police. A 
fundamental characteristic of such systems is the spatial separation between suppliers and 
consumers. No market signals exist to identify efficient and inefficient geographical arrange-
ments ; thus, the location problem is one that arises in both East and West, in planned and 
in market economies. 
This problem is being studied at IIASA by the Public Facility Location Task, which 
started in 1979. The expected results of this Task are a comprehensive state-of-the-art 
survey of current theories and applications, an established network of international con-
tacts among scholars and institutions in different countries, a framework for comparison, 
unification, and generalization of existing approaches, as well as the fonnulation of new 
problems and approaches in the field of optimal location theory. 
This report consists of two parts: the first is a nontechnical description of the pro-
posed general framework for analyzing location problems, the second describes mathe-
matical models for static single-service facility-location problems and their possible exten-
sions and improvements. 
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Abstract. This paper, a condensed report of the present state of the work in the Public Facility 
Location Task (formerly the Normative Location Modeling Task) at IIASA, has three main aims: 
first, to build a general framework for location problems; second, to use this framework to unify 
existing location models; and, third, to use the framework to develop new, more general, and more 
meaningful location models. Suggestions are also given on how to introduce multiple services and 
multiple time periods in location problems. The multiactivity dynamic location models that this 
perspective generates is the subject of future research in the Public Facility Location Task. 
This first part of the paper gives a nontechnical description of the proposed general framework 
for analyzing location problems. The second part will describe mathematical models for static, 
single-service, facility location problems and their possible extensions and improvements, and will 
appear in the next issue . 
I Introduction 
The Public Facility Location (PFL) Task, formerly called the Normative Location 
Modeling Task, was undertaken in a rather exploratory way in October 1979, within 
the Human Settlements and Services Area at IIASA. In spite of the esoteric-sounding 
terminology, the PFL problem is one that is experienced daily and can be rephrased 
as: How can the location of public services and facilities be planned in an optimal 
way? A first step is to put aside the problem of the precise definition of such terms 
as 'planning', 'location', 'public', 'service', and 'optimal', and, instead, focus attention 
on operational tools, a topic already the subject of a vast amount of literature. 
To begin a study of location modeling the following general goals are useful: 
( 1) a comprehensive review of the existing theoretical and applied literature on 
optimal location should be made; 
(2) after this has been done a state-of-the-art review of all work on optimal location 
modeling should be assembled; and 
(3) simultaneously an international communication network among scientists working 
on location problems should be built . 
Although the above goals 112-ve actually been implemented and have been found useful, 
as the work progresses, more precise definitions are soon required: 
(a) By far the greatest unsolved problem in this field of study is the lack of inter-
disciplinary work. Although this statement sounds just as general as the three main 
goals, it is not. A glance at the literature on location problems is enough to realize 
that most approaches and results are as diverse and scattered as the different trainings 
and backgrounds of their authors. It is for this reason that international cooperation 
among scholars studying location problems is important. 
(b) In order to establish an efficient interdisciplinary study, general unifying frame-
works are required for location problems. This seems to be the most promising way 
to approach the state-of-the-art review on the subject, and the most likely way for 
IIASA to make an original theoretical contribution. 
(c) If optimal location problems are not to be doomed to the realm of mathematical 
skill games, they must be related to the more general and realistic problem of planning 
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optimal locational structures for interacting urban activity systems. This is likely to 
be the most promising applied IIASA contribution. 
With these goals in mind, work has begun at IIASA, and some results have been 
achieved . The purpose of this paper is to present this work, first by stating the 
limitations and shortcomings of the present state of the research and then by pointing 
to the main achievements and suggested approaches for further research. 
There are four main shortcomings to this research. First, a general theory has yet 
to be developed, although some unifying issues have been exploited. However, it 
must be said that the path towards unification is not really difficult; it simply 
requires some time and effort, and it proves itself to be a fruitful one. 
Second, some important approaches to the study of location modeling are lacking, 
as a result of limitations in time and knowledge. Among them, mention should be 
made of the multiobjective approach, the voting decision procedures, and the use of 
pricing policies (parallel to, or alternative to, physical-stocks planning). 
Third, a deeper analysis of the relevant welfare theory behind the optimization 
models has not been carried out. This seems indeed to be one of the most promising 
issues for future research, both on a microeconomic and on a macroeconomic scale. 
Fourth, some algorithmic problems still require a rigorous solution, although 
heuristic tools that give good solutions are available. This is another strand of future 
research, and a challenge for applied mathematicians. 
The main achievements and suggested approaches for future research can be 
categorized into three groups beginning with the physical interpretation of results, 
solutions, and main properties. This approach has always been kept in mind, and 
easily understandable rules-of-thumb have been sought and suggested when possible. 
The general direction implied here is that a qualitative understanding of the structure 
of the problem is sometimes more useful than being able to generate numerical 
solutions. Although this issue is listed among the achievements, it must be said that 
only the tip of the iceberg has been scratched, and a considerable amount of work is 
needed along this path. 
The second main asset of this study is that all the newly proposed models have 
been built on existing ones that have been included as special cases. This is a 
suggested standard for future research; nothing has to be thrown away, and every-
thing can be used as a start for a generalization. This is not just a theoretical issue, 
as it may appear to be at first sight. Including existing problems as special cases 
usually implies being able to generalize special problems, as well as -solution techniques. 
The last main contribution of this work is the more realistic assumptions that have 
been introduced for users' behavior. This approach is also just in the beginning stage, 
and the problem behind it is worth further theoretical and empirical research. 
2 General ~ues 
2.1 The facility location system 
Broadly speaking, the general aim of a location pattern, for a given set of public 
facilities, is twofold: 
1. to be as near as possible to the demand, in order to reduce transport costs; and 
2. to keep the cost of establishing the facilities as low as possible, both by choosing 
low-cost locations and by reducing the number of facilities to be established. 
Since these two goals are usually in conflict, some trade-off has to be found between 
them. The need for such a trade-off is the reason why nontrivial location problems 
exist. 
In order to build a general framework, it is useful to split the location problem 
into two subproblems. 
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(a) The first is the problem of allocation, where the transportation pattern between 
the demand locations and the service facilities is decided. The allocation problem is 
thus mainly concerned with the first goal of reducing transport costs. 
(b) The second is the problem of facility location, where the locations of the facilities 
are chosen. The location problem is thus mainly concerned with the second goal of 
low-cost location. 
Of course, the allocation and location subproblems are related and cannot be 
solved separately. However, this does not mean that they are both controlled by the 
same decisionmaker, nor that the two possible decisionmakers agree. Figure 1 shows 
the way in which the two subproblems interact in the most general case. 
Two formal operators have been introduced : the locator and the allocator. They 
are defined below: 
Locator's decision-the locator operates as follows : 
(a) compares the current location and size of existing facilities with the demand 
allocated to them; 
(b) evaluates the costs and benefits associated with the current state of the system 
and with its possible changes; and 
(c) generates a new pattern of sizes and location of facilities, both by establishing new 
facilities and by demolishing old ones. (Of course, building and demolition costs are 
taken into account at this stage.) 
Allocator's decision-the allocator operates as follows: 
(a) compares the potential demand from each demand location, the existing size and 
location of facilities, and the transport costs (not necessarily measured in terms of 
money) between the demand and the facility location; and 
(b) generates a pattern of trips between the demand and facility locations, taking into 
account both transport costs and available capacity. 
I 
Allocator 's decision 
accessibility potential 
sensitive demand 
demand mechanism 
actual accessibility 
demand evaluation 
travel congestion 
sensitive demand 
costs 
I 
mechanism 
)-
location 
and size of 
facilities 
location 1 demand 
and size of location allocation to 
facilities and size of facilities 
facilities 
I 
establishing Locator's 
demolition costs decision 
Figure 1. The general location allocation system. 
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Although it has already been stated, it is worth stressing again that location and 
allocation are not necessarily (nor usually) decided by the same decisionmaker. More 
specifically, it often happens that although location may have a single decisionmaker 
(for example, a planning authority or a firm) allocation may be decided by customers. 
In the latter case, the resulting trip pattern is the pooled output of many individual 
decisions. Such an aggregate of microscopic decision units will still be called an 
'allocator' operator, although it is in no way necessarily implied that it has a rationally 
consistent overall behavior. 
In order to have a better understanding of how the allocator works, it is useful to 
make a further division into two subsystems. The first of these is the accessibility-
sensitive demand mechanism. In many services the total actual demand cannot be 
estimated beforehand; rather, it depends on the location, size, and proximity of the 
facilities. Usually, the demand will increase with the accessibility of the service and 
is, therefore, accessibility-sensitive. The accessibility-sensitive demand mechanism 
receives as inputs the potential demand (that is, the maximum demand which can be 
generated) and the evaluation of the accessibility to the service for each demand 
location. It then generates the actual demand from each demand location, as a 
fraction of the potential demand, according to some accessibility nondecreasing 
function. 
The second subsystem necessary in the allocator's decision process is the congestion-
sensitive demand mechanism. Just as demand can be generated by high accessibility 
to the service, it can also be discouraged by overcrowded facilities. An example where 
both mechanisms operate is leisure and recreational facilities. Usually, the higher the 
availability and nearness of swimming pools, the higher will be the number of people 
using them. On the other hand, if a swimming pool is overcrowded, people will tend 
to look for another one, or maybe go back home. Therefore, the congestion-sensitive 
demand mechanism receives as inputs the actual demand from each location, the 
location and size of facilities in each location, and the transport costs between 
demand and facility locations. It then generates the evaluation of accessibility from 
each demand location (accounting both for nearness and for congestion) and the 
travel pattern between demand and facility locations. 
The interaction between the two allocator subsystems is perhaps better understood 
if rephrased in dynamic terms. Starting with some a priori estimate of accessibility, 
the accessibility-sensitive demand mechanism generates a demand. This demand is fed 
into the congestion-sensitive demand mechanism, which then allocates it to facilities, 
evaluates the resulting congestion in each facility, accounts for this in evaluating a 
new estimate of accessibility, and sends this information as a feedback to the 
accessibility-sensitive demand mechanism. A new actual demand, depending on the 
new congestion-reduced accessibility evaluation, is thus generated, and the same 
process is repeated over and over again, until some equilibrium state is reached, 
provided it exists. 
2.2 The service mechanism 
2.2.1 Introduction. The general qualitative framework defined in section 2.1 is wide 
enough to include most service location problems. However, it does not give answers 
to such questions as: Who are the locators and the allocators? How much do they 
agree or disagree? Who (or what) is traveling, where is he (or it) traveling to and 
why? Who is paying for travel costs? Who is paying for establishing facilities? 
Most of these questions can be given a definite answer only by introducing a 
definite kind of service. However, some useless generality can be eliminated by 
assuming that all public services and facilities share the following two reasonable 
features and properties: 
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(a) The locator is a public authority; he basically agrees with the users and their 
goals (the case of the 'bad tyrant' will be neglected), and sometimes he may also be 
assumed to be the user himself. 
(b) The locator, a public authority, pays for establishing the service facilities. 
Note that no special assumption for the allocator has been introduced. This is 
because of the varying behavior of the allocator which is the very reason different 
service mechanisms can be found. The distinction between the public decisionmaker 
and the users may be sharp or weak, as shown by the following extreme cases. 
When the same decisionmaker controls both the locator and the allocator, that is, 
when there is no difference between public authorities and users, all costs (travel and 
establishing costs) are paid by the users. An example of how this may happen is the 
US primary school system, where users pay location-dependent taxes and at the same 
time control to some extent the location, size, and allocation of their own school 
facilities. The US case does not hold in most European countries, where the very 
opposite can sometimes be found. In Italy, for instance, overhead (location-
independent) taxes are paid for primary schools, but location and allocation are 
centrally planned by a public authority, so that the resulting allocations may 
sometimes be in conflict with users' preferences. 
The above examples focus attention on two main families of service mechanisms: 
services where the same decisionmaker controls location and allocation, referred to in 
this paper as delivery systems, and services where location and allocation are controlled 
by different decisionmakers , referred to as users-attracting systems. 
2.2.2 Delivery systems. A delivery system is defined in the following way. 
(I) The same decisionmaker (usually a public authority and/or an agency) controls 
location of facilities and allocation of services to users. 
(2) Users do not travel; that is, service is delivered from the facilities to the users, 
and transport costs are not charged to the users. 
(3) Every cost (including transportation) is paid by the same public decisionmaker. 
There are many examples of delivery systems of which three are mentioned here. 
Fire emergency services fulfill the three requirements, as long as no bill has to be paid 
for fire services. Police patrol systems is a second example of delivery systems. 
Health care emergency (or ambulance) systems, can also be considered as delivery 
systems, as long as the decision to use them is not affected by transport costs and is 
therefore price-insensitive. 
The main distinguishing feature of delivery systems is the direction and kind of 
transport flows. Transport always takes place from facility locations to demand 
locations, and users do not travel; they are served at home. A delivery system is the 
simplest location problem one can conceive, since no conflicting goals arise (except 
for the usual transport-location trade-off problem). No user's behavior model is 
needed, since users do not behave at all in such systems (the reasonable assumption of 
accessibility and congestion insensitive demand is implied here for such systems-
hopefully, people do not cause fires just because they live near to a fire station), and 
every cost is paid (or can be assumed to be paid) by the same decisionmaker. 
Figure 2 shows the typical direction of transport flows in a delivery system. 
o-o ~~D 
Figure 2. A typical delivery-system flow pattern. 
0 service facilities 
Q demand locations 
- service delivery from service facilities 
to demand locations 
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It may be useful to point out that a delivery system closely resembles the classical 
'plant-location' or 'warehouse-location' problems used in private-sector locational 
decisions and found in the operations research and management science literature 
(Balinski, 1961; Efroymson and Ray, 1966; ReVelle and Rojeski, 1970; Hansen and 
Kaufman, 1976; Erlenkotter, 1978; van Roy and Erlenkotter, 1980). This means 
that most (perhaps all) delivery-system location problems can be solved by well known 
and reasonably simple existing techniques. 
2.2.3 Users-attracting systems. A users-attracting system is the very opposite of a 
delivery system; it is the appropriate model for most meaningful urban service 
systems, and it also raises unsolved problems and needs further research. The typical 
service mechanism of a users-attracting system is defined in the following way: 
(I) Location and allocation are controlled by different decision makers. For our 
purposes, it can be assumed that location is controlled by a planner (usually a public 
authority or agency) whereas allocation is controlled by users. (Users are not single 
decisionmakers, they are an aggregate of possibly goal-conflicting people . Let it be 
provisionally assumed, however, that conflicting problems among users can be 
neglected, and 'average' users' goals can be defined .) 
(2) Users travel; that is, they have to go to the facility locations in order to be served. 
This also means they have to pay for traveling. 
(3) Although transport costs are charged to the users (recall that transport costs are 
not necessarily paid in terms of money) , costs for establishing facilities are paid by 
the planner or public decisionmaker. 
Three good examples of users-attracting systems are some schools, some health care 
systems, and cultural and recreational services. High schools, for instance, often meet 
all three of the above definitions, although the first definition needs some care when 
it is applied to primary schools, since it is not always clear who are the users and 
what goals they are pursuing. In the author's opinion, children are the users; but it 
is well known that children do not like to go to school, although public educational 
authorities force them to go. This is a typical conflicting-goals problem. In some 
other people's opinion parents are the users, and in this case a user-planner general 
agreement is more likely to be found. 
With the exceptions only of emergency ambulance systems and of home health care 
delivery systems, the health care system in many countries meets the three definitions 
given above. Indeed, the health care system poses new modeling problems, since it 
exhibits a multilevel structure as far as the patient-or user-is concerned. A typical 
patient history could be the progression from a day-hospital for a check-up to a 
specialized hospital where the patient was found to have cancer, then to a specialized 
surgical hospital where he was operated on, after which he was sent to a rehabilitation 
center until there was a full recovery. If he is lucky enough, he will find all the 
facilities he needs in the same locations. But this is unlikely, since, although general 
purpose facilities (for example, day-hospitals) may be fairly scattered, specialized or 
infrequent treatments tend to be concentrated in a few locations (for example, 
rehabilitation centers). The health care facilities optimal location must take this 
multilevel structure and behavior into account, in order to evaluate not only 
accessibility from demand locations to facility locations, but also accessibility within 
facilities belonging to different levels. 
Public libraries, theaters, and swimming pools are several examples of cultural and 
recreational services where the travel pattern resulting from users' behavior is usually 
far from a planned one. Different tastes may lead to choices which disagree with 
distance minimizing. Unlike the delivery systems, in the users-attracting systems every 
possible complication can arise (and usually does). Location goals (or planner goals) 
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and allocation goals (or user goals) may be different and conflicting, although the 
public facility assumption usually implies they are not. A model for users' behavior 
is needed, since usually such simple rules as nearest-facility allocation are unrealistic 
and do not fit the actual behavior. Accessibility and congestion sensitiveness may 
also be required, as in the case of recreational services. The typical direction of 
transport flows in a users-attracting system is shown in figure 3. 
It may be useful to point out that models for users-attracting systems are hardly 
found in the operations research (OR) and management science literature, except for 
special cases, which can be (or are forced to be) reduced to the usual plant-location 
form. On the other hand, the problem of modeling location systems based on actual 
users' behavior appears in most regional science and urban geography literature (for 
example, Lowry, 1964; Harris, 1964; Huff, 1964; 1966; Lakshmanan and Hansen, 
1965; Wilson, 1970; 1974; 1976; Coelho and Wilson, 1976; 1977; Leonardi, 
1978 ; l 979a ; Harris and Wilson, 1978). Most of these models are based on the so-
called gravity, or spatial interactions assumption, according to which the number of 
trips between demand and facility locations is proportional to a smoothly decreasing 
function of distance or travel cost (other imposed constraints being met). 
Although the above models are based on more general and sensible physical 
assumptions, as compared to the usual OR 'plant-location' models, the development 
of mathematical tools and algorithms have not been as good as in the OR field. This 
is an area where some unsolved problems can still be found, and further research is 
needed. 
o-o ~~D D service facilities Q demand locations _. trips from demand locations to facilities 
Figure 3. A typical users-attracting system flow pattern. 
2 .3 The users' behavior 
2.3.l Introduction. The purpose of section 2.3 is to introduce some specific 
assumptions and models for users' trip-making and facility-choosing behavior. 
Therefore, from now on reference will be made only to the users-attracting systems. 
Here again it can be said that, although each kind of service is associated with a 
different user's behavior, many common features in the models and techniques can 
be found. The main issues leading towards some unifying results can be summarized 
into three groups. 
The problem of relating users' choices to some optimizing behavior is the first 
main issue. Although a completely random-choice behavior is possible, in most 
meaningful cases some regularities can be found, which lead to the assumption that 
users consistently choose locations with some overall optimization criterion. Gravity 
and spatial interaction models play an important role in this field, since they have 
both good empirical testing and optimization interpretations. 
The second issue is the problem of defining a suitable general form for an 
accessibility-sensitive demand mechanism. This is a problem seldom found both in 
OR and in regional science literature. It is therefore a good topic for further research, 
and a most promising one, since many public services exhibit accessibility-sensitive 
demand. 
The third problem is that of defining a suitable, general form for a congestion-
sensitive demand mechanism. Of course, congestion mechanisms are the main subject 
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of queuing theory. But the queuing theory approach is micro and is therefore 
unlikely to be useful to solve problems of realistic size (that is, with many service 
locations). Some simpler models are therefore needed, perhaps based on more 
aggregate assumptions and variables than queuing models. 
In the following subsections a general, nontechnical description of ways to solve 
the above problems is given, and some possible further generalizations are suggested. 
2.3.2 Planned versus unplanned allocation. Although it sounds like a contradiction 
(and in the opinion of the author it is, to some extent), it is worth considering the 
case of users-attracting systems where allocation is centrally planned, although the 
users pay for travel costs. Titis is not necessarily a strong inconsistency with the 
public nature of the services to be located. If, for instance, users have a general 
tendency to minimize travel costs, but may also wish to trade off other costs or 
benefits (such as congestion or quality of service), although a public decisionmaker 
strictly minimizes travel cost, it cannot be said that he is really being inconsistent 
with users' goals. He is just being narrow-minded and uninformed on some details of 
the users' preferences, although he is aware of some of their main and simplest 
tendencies (such as travel cost minimizing). Since he is unable to predict what users 
will do when facilities will be provided, he just imposes on them a behavior according 
to his simplified version of their own goals. This approach is somewhat justified 
(although not necessarily to be agreed with) when there is no difference between users 
and public decisionmakers, in either goals or costs to be paid, or when the public 
decisionmaker has enough normative power to effectively impose the allocation rule. 
The US-Italian primary school location-allocation examples are relevant again here. 
As already stated, there is no difference between such problems and classical plant-
location problems, as far as mathematical models and solution algorithms are concerned. 
The induced users' behavior follows the simple nearest-facility allocation rule depicted 
in figure 4. 
Let it now be assumed that at least one of the two justifications for the approach 
of the decisionmaker no longer holds true, or is likely to be unfair. It may happen, 
for instance, that trade-offs between travel costs and other users' costs and benefits 
are too relevant to be neglected. Obvious examples are health care (nonemergency) 
services, most kinds of schools, and cultural and recreational facilities. It may also 
happen that the public planner has no real normative control on the way users 
allocate themselves to facilities. He is just hoping they will go to the nearest facilities, 
and he makes his plan accordingly. In this case, allocation should not be referred to 
as 'planned'. What the public decisionmaker is actually doing is using a bad, 
unreliable users' behavior model. 
Many more examples could be given, which regretably raise complicated social and 
political issues, outside the scope of this paper. Let it be assumed, therefore, that 
there are enough intuitive reasons to focus our interest on location systems where 
allocation is left to the users' unplanned behavior. These systems will be referred to 
as 'unplanned allocation systems'. 
Without much loss of generality, let it also be assumed that, other things being 
equal, users tend to minimize travel cost. It then follows that possible deviations 
from this tendency may result if some of the 'other things' are not perfectly 'equal'. 
D--0 
0--D 
D 
0 
service facilities 
demand locations 
- trips from demand locations to nearest facilities 
Figure 4. A typical users' flow pattern for planned-allocation users-attracting systems. 
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If the overall result of such a process is examined, one can expect to find a frequency 
of users' trips that decreases with the cost of traveling from demand location to 
facilities. The usual trip pattern resulting from this behavior looks like the one 
shown in figure 5. That is, although most trips are to the nearest facility, a sizeable 
amount are to a further facility . The pattern shown in figure 5 is an intermediate 
one between two possible extremes: 
(a) All flows go to the nearest facilities, which then reduces to the already discussed 
planned-allocation problem. 
(b) Flows are evenly split among facilities , which is equivalent to a users' behavior 
totally insensitive to travel cost. 
D facilites 
O demands 
~ I trips from demand locations 
__.I to facilities 
Figure S. A typical users' flow pattern for unplanned-allocation users-attracting systems. 
2.3 .3 Spatial-interaction-based allocation models. This section focuses on possible 
useful ways to handle the unplanned-allocation case discussed in section 2.3.1 . 
Provided users are assumed to have different tastes, value judgments, and cost-benefit 
evaluations for each facility, their behavior can be modeled by using one of the 
following two approaches. 
1. The disaggregate approach, where a complete list of all users in each location is 
kept, and the utility functions (or at least the preference ordering relations) on 
alternative facilities are defined for each user in the list. This approach has been 
recently proposed by Hanjoul (1980). 
2. The aggregate approach, which is useful when the list of users becomes very large 
and it is impractical to keep track of every user and hopeless to define so many 
preference orders. Some general regularities in aggregate behavior are usually found, 
when the overall result of superimposing all these different preference orders is 
observed. The frequency of choice usually decreases with travel costs. If needed, or 
if available data make it possible, other relevant explanatory variables can be 
introduced. Such observed data can be plotted and fitted to some curve (when a 
good fit is usually found). 
It is obvious that the first approach can be used only when the number of different 
users, or preference orders, in the list is small. It is, however, interesting when 
microbehavior exploration is the main concern. But for operational purposes the 
aggregate approach seems better, when there are so many users that they cannot be 
listed one by one. (This is, by the way, the usual case with real public facilities.) 
Approach 2 gives rise to what are usually referred to as 'gravity', or 'spatial-
interaction' models. In loose terms (more technical definitions will be given in later 
sections), the main feature of a spatial-interaction model is to replace the very sharp 
assumption of travel-cost minimizing with the smoother assumption of space-discount 
behavior. Whereas the travel-cost-minimizing user places infinite value on the nearest 
facility , the space-discounting user ranks all facilities in a distance-decreasing order, 
the distance-decrease shape being given by a curve similar to those shown in figure 6. 
Moreover, space-discounting users are assumed to be stochastic, and choose facilities 
with probabilities proportional to the space-discount factor (other possible constraints 
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being met). Stochastic behavior here is merely a model of one's ignorance, since 
detailed information on each user has been lost after the aggregation process(I>. 
A useful property of the family of curves shown in figure 6 is that it includes the 
nearest-facility allocation rule as a special case (curve I). It also includes the opposite 
limiting case, that is, the random (distance or travel cost independent) allocation rule 
(horizontal line 4). In real problems, however, cases will be found between these 
two extremes: 2 and 3. 
Although gravity or spatial-interaction models were first developed empirically, 
many alternative theoretical justifications for them have been proposed in the last 
ten years, so that what once seemed to be slightly more than a rule-of-thumb model 
has become a topic worthy of consideration by theoretical economists and geographers , 
mathematicians, and statisticians, besides regional scientists. Such theoretical works 
range from the classical entropy maximizing approach (Wilson, 1970), which is an 
aggregate one, to disaggregate stochastic-choice models, among which the logit model is 
the best known (McFadden, 1974a; 1974b), and to models that derive macroeconomic 
interpretations by aggregating random-choice models, such as in the consumer surplus-
maximizing approach (Neuburger, 1971; Williams, 1977; Coelho and Williams, 1978; 
Coelho and Wilson, 1976), or in the accessibility-maximizing approach (Leonardi, 
1973; 1975; 1978; Williams and Senior, 1978). 
In spite of the seemingly strong differences among these approaches, it is 
surprising how they all give rise to the same models, as far as their mathematical 
form is concerned. This is not really surprising, if one considers the fact that the 
logit model , which is supposed to have definite roots in random utility theory 
(being a typical 'micro' model), is merely a multinomial logistic distribution . On the 
other hand, the entropy maximizing approach, which has been developed in statistical 
mechanics (and makes no assumptions on the microscopic behavior of the system 
under study, but just poses some weak constraints at the aggregate level) wves rise to 
the same multinomial logistic distribution. (The Boltzmann probability distribution 
used in thermodynamics and the Fermi-Dirac distribution of quantum mechanics are 
nothing but special forms of logit models.) 
Besides the theoretical significance of this general consistency between different 
interpretations, it is operationally comfortable to know that one has to work with just 
one mathematical formulation. Although the subject will be treated in more detail in 
later sections, it is worthwhile at this point to give the general form for a spatial 
f(tf) 
'--==-~~~~~~~~~~~--~d 
lower limit: nearest-
facility allocation rule 
2 strong spac<>-discount 
effect 
weak space-discount 
effect 
4 upper limit : random 
choice allocation rule 
Figure 6. General shape for a family of space-discount functions. 
(I) A microeconomic stochastic behavior might also be introduced, if each user is assumed to have a 
probability distribution on utilities assigned to each facility . This is basically what random utility 
theory is. But luckily enough random-utility based models are indistinguishable from gravity 
models at the macrolevel. They are actually a possible alternative interpretation of the same 
models, rather than new ones. 
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interaction model, which is as follows : 
f(C11 )W1 
s,, = G1Lf(C,,)W; ' 
where I 
i, j are subscripts labeling the locations of demand and facilities, respectively, 
G1 is the total demand for service generated in i per unit time, 
W; is a measure of attractiveness of facility in j, 
C11 is the total cost associated with a displacement from i to j, measured in 
appropriate units, 
f(-) is a space discount function, of the kind discussed above, and 
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S11 is the number of customers living in location i and using the facility location j. 
The space-discount function is often assumed to have some special form , like a 
negative exponential, or a negative power function, but none of these assumptions are 
needed to analyze the general structure of a spatial-interaction model. On the 
contrary, terms such as 'generation' and 'attractiveness' need a better definition, since 
they are related to the problems of modeling sensitiveness of demand both to travel 
cost or accessibility and to congestion or overcrowding of facilities. 
2.3.4 Accessibility-sensitive demand. Most existing public facility location models 
assume both allocation of customers to the nearest facility and insensitiveness of 
demand to accessibility to the service. But, as already discussed in the introductory 
sections , this assumption is not appropriate for many services, where the total 
demand cannot be estimated independently of the size and location of facilities. In 
other words, demand is induced by the provision of the service, and usually the easier 
facilities can be reached, the higher will be the demand . In loose economic terms, it 
may be said that travel cost acts as a price to be paid in order to use the service, and 
total demand is nonincreasing with this cost. Although the sensitive-demand problem 
has been stated in market-like terms, it is in no way related to market economies 
rather than to planned economies. Travel costs must be paid everywhere, since they 
depend on the existence of space distance, and are not necessarily measured in terms 
of money. (In most urban settlements travel time is usually the best measure of 
travel cost.) 
In order to define a general structure for an accessibility-sensitive-demand model, 
some definite measures of accessibility have to be introduced. The three main 
possibilities are listed below. 
(a) Accessibility is measured by means of either the nearest facility travel cost or the 
arithmetic mean of travel costs to all facilities. Both measures tacitly assume that 
customers agree on evaluating distances according to a minimum distance, or an 
arithmetic mean basis. These assumptions are usually inconsistent with a general 
spatial-interaction behavior. 
(b) Accessibility is a measure of users' benefit consistent with a spatial-interaction 
behavior. Since according to most spatial interaction data, users seem to apply a 
definite distance-decreasing discount factor on facilities, the most natural measure of 
accessibility seems to be a sum of the capacity (or attractiveness) of all service 
facilities , each one discounted with its own space-discount factor. Such a measure is 
closely related to early concepts of social physics and regional analysis (like potentials 
and related concepts). [See Steward (1948) and Vickerman (1974) for a review.] In 
its modern form it has been introduced by Hansen (1959) , and developed by Ingram 
(1971 ), Weibull (1976) , Leonardi ( 1976), Smith (1976), Davidson (1977) , and 
Sheppard ( 1979). Its general form is : 
A = It<qwi , (2) 
I 
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where 
A is the measure of accessibility to the service from a given demand location, 
W; is a weight measuring attractiveness of a facility in j, 
c1 is the cost of traveling from the demand location to the facility in j, and 
f(-) is a space-discount function. 
(c) Accessibility is measured by an 'average' travel cost, where the averaging operator is 
consistent with a spatial-interaction behavior. Since users perceive distance by means 
of a space discount function , which is averaged to build an accessibility measure [see 
(b) above], it is natural to obtain a measure of 'average' travel cost by applying the 
inverse of the space-discount function to accessibility. That is, 
c=r1(A), (3) 
where 
C is the average travel cost from a given demand location having accessibility A 
defined by equation (2), and 
r 1 (-) is the inverse function off('). 
Average travel cost as computed by equation (3) is the only possible average ensuring 
consistency in problems of aggregating and disaggregating spatial-choice models. It 
has been discussed in depth by many authors (usually for special functional forms), 
among them Wilson (1974), Williams (1977), and Leonardi (1979b). 
Two general forms are possible for an accessibility-sensitive-demand generation 
model depending on whether accessibility is measured by some actual 'accessibility' 
index, such as given by equation (2), or by some measure of 'average' (including 
minimum distance) cost. The first general form is an accessibility-increasing demand 
curve, such as the one shown in figure 7. In general, demand G will increase up to a 
maximum value P, corresponding to the maximum value of A, which is reached when 
all travel costs are zero (that is, space disappears). Furthermore, generated demand G 
will be bounded from above by a maximum potential demand P, which is always 
finite (even though possibly very large) if the total population living in the demand 
location is finite. 
The second general form for an accessibility-sensitive-demand model is an average-
cost-decreasing demand curve, such as the one shown in figure 8. In general, demand 
G will reach its (physically feasible) maximum P for zero cost, and then decrease as 
travel cost increases. The upper bound P has the same meaning as before. 
Of course there is no real difference between the two formulations given above, 
since the two demand curves can be mapped one on the other. The choice of the 
best formulation is a matter of convenience. 
Perhaps it is also worth mentioning that, just as nearest-facility travel cost is 
included in 'average costs' many special measures are incorporated in 'accessibility 
potential demand, P 
~ -
maximum demand, P 
0 
/ maximum accessibility (for zero costs) 
"-~~~~~~~~~~-"-~~~---~ 
Hansen accessibility, A 
Figure 7. An accessibility-increasing demand curve. 
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measures' as defined by equation (2), including the widely used 'coverage-based' 
accessibility measure. This measure is defined as the number (or the total capacity, 
or any measure proportional to them) of facilities which can be reached within a 
given maximum travel-cost range. This is a special case of equation (2), where[(-) is 
a step function, such as the one shown in figure 9. 
However, a step function is not the best one to be used for elastic-demand models, 
since the way it evaluates distance is typical of emergency services, which usually 
(and hopefully) have inelastic demand. 
potential demand, P 
- - -. maximum demand,P 
0 
distance , d 
Figure 8. An average-cost-decreasing demand curve (d is either average distance or else nearest 
facility distance). 
[(CJ 
0 c 
travel cost, C 
Figure 9. Step space discount function for 'coverage' accessibility measures (C is the maximum 
range). 
2.3.S Congestion-sensitive demand. As with accessibility-sensitive demand, most 
facility location models ignore possible demand sensitiveness to congestion. Indeed, 
the best-known models in the literature on static optimal location modeling are 
'uncapacitated', which means they assume a total capacity that always matches total 
demand. 
Just like travel cost, congestion is a cost that all customers have to pay (usually in 
nonmonetary units) in order to be served, no matter what economic system rules 
their country. Although congestion costs are not as unavoidable as travel costs since 
there is no real physical bound on building new facilities, capacity expansion usually 
does not solve the problem. This is true mainly when the accessibility-sensitive-
demand mechanism is also at work, since increase in capacity increases accessibility, 
which in turn generates new demand. The joint effect of both mechanisms may 
therefore result in increased congestion because of increased capacity. This frequently 
happens with many services , not necessarily of a recreational nature, such as 
nonemergency health care facilities. It always happens when capacity expansion is 
decided locally , without an overall look at the whole system of locations . 
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The simplest congestion~ensitive-demand model (although by no means the only 
possible one) is a linear feedback signal that is proportional to the difference between 
total capacity and attracted demand, which changes the value of the attractiveness 
weights for each facility. (It is assumed that attracted demand may never be greater 
than total capacity, by definition.) The resulting weights give a new value for 
accessibilities, which in tum generate different values for total demand, and so on, 
over and over again, until some equilibrium (if any) is reached. This two-step 
mechanism can be given the following, simple mathematical formulation. 
1. Congestion~ensitive attractiveness weights are evaluated according to the formula 
W; = Oj(X; - D;), (4) 
where 
X1 is the capacity of facility in location j, 
n, is the total demand attracted in location j' and 
Oj are given constants, typical of each location. 
2. The new accessibility resulting from the new weights is evaluated by means of 
equation (2). 
A(X-D) = Lfi<C1)U'J (5) 
I 
where 
A(·) is the accessibility measure, expressed as a function of the differences between 
capacity and demand. 
Although accessibility has been used in the above formulation , of course a similar 
formulation can be given in terms of average travel cost. 
It may be worth noting that congestion found at the destination is not the only 
possible kind of congestion evaluated by customers. Congestion found on the road 
links used to reach the destination also determines the choice. However, a model 
embedding both optimal location and allocation and optimal traffic assignment goes 
beyond the scope of this paper, and will be the subject for future research. Such 
models could be developed building upon the work of Evans (1976) and Boyce and 
LeBlanc (1979). Here for simplicity it will be assumed that the traffic generated by 
the set of facilities under consideration is small enough to leave the prevailing traffic 
conditions unaltered. This assumption is reasonable when a single type of facility is 
considered, but it may become unrealistic for a multiactivity location problem. 
2.3.6 Overall structure of the accessibility-congestion-sensitive allocation system. 
Now that all of its subsystems have been defined, the overall allocation system can 
be assembled. Its general structure is shown in figure I 0. 
The contents and meaning of each subsystem need no further explanation, since 
they have been described in detail in the preceding sections. The flows linking the 
subsystems are worth some explanation, however. Taken as a whole, the system 
receives two inputs, the potential demand P and the capacity X, and gives the 
allocation matrix S as an output. Whereas the input P is totally exogenous, possibly 
given by some population forecast model, the input Xis a control vector, whose 
choice determines size and location of facilities. The output S will be subject to 
evaluation in the decision process, together with the control vector X, since benefits and 
costs will depend on them. Two main feed-back loops can be seen in the inner flows. 
(a) The main loop links demand generation, allocation, and congestion evaluation. 
The demand generation subsystem (or accessibility~ensitive-demand model) receives 
an accessibility estimate A , generates a demand G and sends it as an input to the 
allocation subsystem. This subsystem (using also the current estimate of attractiveness 
W) allocates the generated demand G to facilities , by means of a general spatial-
A unifying framework for public facility location problems-part 1 1015 
interaction model, and evaluates the total demand D attracted by each facility. The 
attracted demand evaluation D is sent to the congestion-sensitive subsystem, which 
compares it with capacity X, evaluates new weights W and new accessibilities A. 
Finally, the new accessibility evaluation is sent back again to the accessibility sensitive 
demand subsystem, and a new cycle is started. 
(b) The smaller loop links the allocation and the congestion evaluation. This is a 
simple loop, nested within the main one, with the only purpose of updating the 
attractiveness vector W, to be used in the allocation model, and the attracted demand 
vector D, to be used in the evaluation of new congestion-sensitive weights. 
A warning will conclude this section. The system has been described in pseudo-
dynamic terms, but its use for a dynamic simulation is not suggested. Although the 
way it works is better understood in dynamic terms, the general model of figure 10 is 
more likely to give good steady-state solutions, rather than the actual transient 
behavior of an allocation system. This is mainly becuase of two reasons. The first is 
that most of the models used, especially the allocation (spatial-interaction) model, are 
equilibrium models. Usually the transient dynamic behavior of a spatial-interaction 
pattern does not fit a gravity model, and it takes some nonnegligible time to settle 
down (provided no further noise is introduced). The second reason is that usually 
real spatial-interaction systems have time lags. The reaction of demand to changes in 
accessibility and in congestion cannot be immediate, nor can demand be assumed to 
receive perfect information on all the changes in every location as soon as these 
changes take place. 
A 
accessibility vector 
-
W attractiveness 
vector 
.__ 
ip potential demand mechanism 
accessibility sensitive 
generated demand model 
demand 
G(P,A) 
t G actual demand 
vector 
allocation of users allocation 
to facilities model 
_ f(C;;)ll'J 
S,I - G, ~j(C11lll'J 
s I 
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I 
t D attracted demand 
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evaluation of congestion and 
congestion and accessibility 
attractiveness evaluator 
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tx capacity vector 
Figure I 0. The overall acc~ssibility-congestion-sensitive allocation model. 
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In spite of this, a rough dynamic use of the model is possible when one is interested 
in long-term changes rather than in transient behavior. In other words, if information 
on system changes is sampled at time intervals at least as long as the average settling-
down time, and if significant input changes can be reasonably assumed to take place 
only at the sampling times, then all that will be observed is a sequence of equilibrium 
states. This kind of analysis is closer to comparative statics, rather than dynamics. 
In any event, the construction of a satisfactory dynamic spatial-interaction framework 
is not an aim of this paper. [Some attempts in this direction can be found in 
Bertuglia and Leonardi (1979), and Wilson (1979).] 
2.4 Goals and tools for service location planning 
2.4.1 Introduction. Whereas the previous sections have been mainly devoted to the 
description of the system's behavior, section 2.4 will review the problem of controlling 
the location-allocation system in some optimal way. This means answering three 
questions. 
I. Which goals are relevant for a service location planning decision? 
2. Which variables can be used to control the systems, and under what constraints? 
3. What is the general form of models corresponding to different goal-control variable 
combinations? 
As already stated in the general introduction, no attempt will be made here to go 
deeply into such complicated problems as the foundations of welfare theory, public 
goods theory, equity theory, and so on. The existing location models have usually 
simple objective functions and constraints, and no large theoretical apparatus is 
needed to interpret and justify them. However, some common features in them are 
general enough to deserve a special discussion. 
Most of these general problems have already been met in the introductory sections: 
the equity-efficiency trade-off problem, which is easily generalized to multiobjective 
conflicting problems; the location-allocation consistency problem; and the 
introduction of actual users' behavior in location models. 
2.4.2 The equity-efficiency trade-off problem. A vast literature can be found on the 
conflict between equity and efficiency in location problems (see Alperovich, 1972; 
McGrew and Monroe, 1975; McAllister, 1976; Morrill and Symons, 1977; Bigman 
and Re Veile, 1978; 1979; and Lea, 1979). Although discussions on the exact 
definition of terms such as 'equity', 'welfare', and 'efficiency' tend to be endless, the 
problem behind these terms is quite simple. Apart from technical details, all measures 
of equity or welfare used in location problems are measures of nearness, ease of 
access, and fair distribution of service to users. This is true for the transport-cost 
minimization criterion used in most models (although some criticism can be raised 
against it as far as fair distribution is concerned), for the maximum coverage criterion 
used in many models for the location of emergency services, and for the consumer-
surplus maximizing models used in locating urban activities with spatial interactions. 
Maximization of access and equitable distribution of service capacity to the 
customers usually implies the opening of many dispersed small facilities. On the 
other hand, efficiency is usually measured in terms of the costs to be paid to establish 
and operate the facilities. Since both costs usually exhibit economies of scale, 
maximization of efficiency often implies concentration of service in a few large 
facilities. In loose terms, an optimal location model might be generally defined as a 
method to find a trade-off between these two conflicting goals. It is also worth 
noting that the existence of these two conflicting goals is the only reason location 
models have some meaning and usefulness. Locational decision taken according to 
only one goal would lead to ridiculous and unrealistic results. 
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From the technical standpoint, there are three ways to introduce equity-efficiency 
goals in location proolems, giving rise to three different broad families of models: 
I. Models where some user's benefit (cost) is maximized (minimized), subject to a 
budget constraint on total cost to establish and run the facilities. This is usually 
considered as the typical formulation for a public facility location problem, since 
public authorities, who are assumed to pay for the costs, are supposed not to use 
their budget for profit making. The above general definition of public facility 
location problems is found in ReVelle et al (1970), ReVelle and Rojeski (1970), 
Swain (1974), and Hansen and Kaufman (1976). 
2. Models where some efficiency measure is maximized, subject to a constraint on the 
minimum users' benefit requirement. Typical examples are the so-called set-covering 
problems, which are also widely used to locate some public facilities (mainly 
emergency services). In its simplest form, a set-covering location problem minimizes 
the number of facilities to be located (the efficiency goal) subject to the requirement 
that each demand location has at least one facility within a given maximum range of 
travel time (the equity constraints). This formulation has been widely used for 
locating emergency services with deliveries from tacilities to demand locations, such as 
fire stations and ambulance systems (Toregas et al, 1971; Re Veile et al, 1976; Plane 
and Hendrick, 1977). 
3. Models where the objective function is the difference between a measure of users' 
benefit and public authority -costs needed to establish and run facilities without any 
constraints. Since the two terms are usually measured in different units, at least one 
of them (usually the cost term) must be weighted with a scaling factor, reflecting the 
judgment of the decisionmaker (or decisionmakers) on their relative importance. 
Although this formulation is usually considered as more suited to private sector 
location problems, it has also been used to analyze trade-offs between benefits and 
costs in public facility location problems (possibly with a sensitivity analysis on the 
scaling factor). This 'bi-objective' approach is discussed in Bigman and ReVelle 
(1979) and Erlenkotter (1977). 
Although these three formulations seem rooted on quite different public welfare 
conceptions, they share many common formal features, to such an extent that they 
can actually be reduced to the same mathematical form and solved with the same 
algorithms. If, for instance, a Lagrangian relaxation is introduced for the constraints 
of the first two types of models, both can be replaced by a model of the third type, 
the Lagrange multiplier acting as a scaling factor. This is even more sensible than the 
original formulations, since it is usually hard, for a public decisionmaker to assess a 
priori the values for a total budget or a minimum travel-time requirement, so that a 
trade-off sensitivity analysis has to be made anyway. 
Other unifying propertie : can be found in the various ways of measuring travel cost 
and accessibility to the users. Although the minimum distance requirement seems 
very different from travel cost minimization, it has been shown (Church and ReVelle, 
1976) that the minimum distance requirement is a special case of travel-cost 
minimization, provided an infinite cost is placed on displacements outside of the 
required range. 
2.4.3 The location-allocation consistency problem. It has been stated in section 2 
that location and allocation may be controlled by different decisionmakers. For the 
case of users' attracting systems, allocation is always left to the users, whereas location 
and size of facilities are decided by a public authority. 
If the simplifying assumption is introduced that users always choose the nearest 
facility, the resulting location models belong to the class of plant-location problems 
found in operations research and management science literature. The recent 
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development of tremendously powerful dual-based algorithms (Bilde and Krarup, 
1977; Erlenkotter, 1978; van Roy and Erlenkotter, 1980; Wolsey, 1980) makes it 
hard to imagine any further improvement on theory and computation for these 
problems. 
If, on the other hand, users are allocated to facilities according to a general spatial-
interaction-based allocation model of the form proposed in section 2.3 , then many 
new theoretical and computational problems arise. 
The general structure of a (possibly dynamic) location model based on a spatial-
interaction allocation rule is shown in figure 11 . 
The variables and symbols introduced in the diagram of figure 11 are defined as 
follows: 
p 
y 
x 
s 
A(P,X) 
is a vector whose components are the potential demands on each demand 
location i, P = [P;]; 
is a vector whose components are the unit time potential demand 
increments in each demand location i, M = [L'>P;]; 
is a vector whose components are the existing service capacities in each 
service location j, Y = [y;]; 
is a vector whose components are the new capacities in each service 
location j, after the location decision has taken place, X = [xj]; 
is the allocation matrix, that is, a matrix whose elements are the flows of 
users between each demand-facility location pair (i , j), S = [S;i] ; 
is the allocation rule, that results from the general model shown in 
figure I 0, that is, A(-, -) is a matrix function of the vectors of potential 
demand and service capacity, and the equation S = A(P, X) holds; 
V(S,P, X) is the public-authority-evaluated users' benefit, that is, V( ·,., ·)is a scalar 
C(Y, X) 
F(P, Y) 
function of the allocation matrix, of the potential demand vector and of 
the capacity vector; 
is the cost paid by the public authority to change the capacity (by 
expansion or demolition), that is, C(-, ·) is a scalar function of the old 
and new capacity vectors; 
is a unit-time discount factor; and 
is the total discounted value for a decision process starting with potential 
demand P and capacity Y. 
The general model of figure 11 can be further specialized, depending on which one of 
the following assumptions holds: 
(a) Both location and allocation are directly decided by the public authority; this 
often (but not necessarily) leads to a problem of the plant-location type. Of course, 
I 
I 
I 
I existing 
capacity Y 
initial 
I potential demandP 
Allocation 
The demand vector P is allocated to facilities according 
to the rule S ; A(P, X) 
Location 
The public authority maximizes the net benefit , 
V(S, X)- C(Y, X), plus the discounted future total 
benefit, r<F(P+ 6P, X): 
F(P. Y) =max ( V(S,P, X)-C(Y, X)+ r<F(P+ 11P, X)] 
x 
with S = A(P, X) 
r 
I 
I 
new I 
capacity X 
P+!Y.P 
potential I 
new demand 
Figure 11. The general form of a dynamic location-allocation model. The variables and symbols 
are defined in section 2.4.3 . 
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in this case no spatial-interaction behavior takes place, since it is inhibited by the 
public authority-imposed behavior. (Many school allocation policies work like this, 
although they are often subject to serious criticisms.) 
(b) Allocation results from unplanned users' behavior, that is, from a spatial-
interaction model. The users' behavior model is known to the public authority, who 
takes it into account when deciding the location and size of facilities. However, the 
benefit evaluation of the public authority is not necessary related to some natural 
users' benefit function, nor does such a function need to exist. This is a case where 
possible conflicting problems may arise, both among users and between the users and 
the public authority. Of course, a spatial-interaction model is not suited to take 
conflicts into account, since it is an aggregate model in which the behavior of all 
users is averaged out. The microscopic approach seems better for this purpose (see 
the fust approach discussed in section 2.3.2), since it can keep track of each user (or 
possibly of each homogenous group of users, if such a grouping can be defined). 
This approach will not be developed here, but it may well be one of the topics for 
future research on location models. 
(c) As in assumption (b), allocation results from unplanned users' behavior, but, 
unlike assumption (b ), some aggregate users' benefit function is assumed to exist. 
More precisely, a scalar function W(S, P, X) can be defined, such that the problem 
maximize W(S, P, X) 
s 
is solved by means of 
S = A(P,X), 
(6) 
(7) 
where A(P, X) is the users' behavior-based allocation rule. Since users behave as if 
they were maximizing function (6), it is natural to call W the users benefit function. 
It is also natural, for a fair public decisionmaker, to use the same benefit function in 
the evaluation, that is, to make the definition 
V(S, P, X) = W(S, P, X) . (8) 
When assumptions (6), (7), and (8) hold, no conflict problem arises between the users 
and the public decisionmaker (PDM), that is, there is perfect consistency between 
location and allocation. 
Assumptions (a), (b), and (c) give rise to the following three families of mathematical 
programming problems. (For simplicity, a static formulation is used; that is, a = 0): 
maximize { V[A(P, X),P, X]-C(Y, X)}, (9a) 
A,X 
that is, the PDM decides both on the allocation rule A and on the size of location of 
facilities X; 
maximize { V[A(P, X),P, X]-C(Y, X)}, (9b) 
x 
that is, the PDM decides on the size and location of facilities X, with the allocation 
rule A given and depending on users' behavior; and 
maximize {maximize VI A(P, X), P, X] - C( Y, X)} , (9c) 
X A 
that is, the PDM decides on the size and location of facilities X, whereas the users 
decide on the allocation rule A. Moreover, both the PDM and the users agree on the 
way to evaluate benefits, since users choose, among all possible allocation rules, the 
one that maximizes V, whereas the PDM chooses, among all possible location 
patterns X, the one that maximizes V - C. 
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2.4.4 Spatial-interaction embedding location models. A noteworthy property of 
problem (9c) is that, since the order with which the maximization operators are 
applied is immaterial, it can be rewritten as: 
maximize maximize { V[A(P, X),P, X]- C(Y, X)}, (10) 
A X 
and this is identical to (9a). This means that, in the case of a perfect consistency 
between location and allocation goals the location problem is formally equivalent to 
a totally planned problem, although with a generally nonlinear objective function. 
Let two special, but still fairly general, assumptions now be introduced: 
(a) The cost function is separable, that is, the total cost can be expressed as the sum 
of individual costs for each facility location: 
C(Y, X) = Lh;(x;), 
I 
(11) 
where h1(-) is a (usually concave) scalar function. The Y vector has been dropped, 
since it is constant, so that it is implicitly taken into account in the way the h;( ·) 
are built. 
(b) The function V(S, P, X) can be expressed as 
V(S,P,X) = '11(S,P-G,X-D), 
where G is the vector of demands generated in each i, G = [fS;;], and Dis the 
vector of demands attracted in each j, D = [ fS;;]. 
(12) 
The meaning of assumption (12) is that users, as well as the public decisionmaker, 
evaluate the allocation pattern S, the unsatisfied demand P- G (generated by the 
accessibility-sensitive mechanism), and the difference between capacity and attracted 
demand X - D (generated by the congestion-sensitive mechanism). If the following 
variables are introduced: 
S;o = P-G; = P;- l_s;,' 
I 
that is, S;0 is the unsatisfied potential demand in demand location i; and 
S0; = X; - D; = X; - LS;; 
i 
that is, S0; is the unused capacity in facility j; and the S matrix is augmented by 
one column [S;0 ] and one row [S0;] (the element S00 is not required), then an 
alternative representation of function 1/J is: 
'11( S) 
subject to 
LS;; +S;o = P;, 
I 
LS;; + S0; = x; . 
i 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
It is also tacitly assumed that '11( ·) is undefined for negative values, so that explicit 
nonnegativity constraints are not needed. 
If assumptions (a) and (b) are introduced into problem (10), the following 
mathematical programming problem is obtained: 
maximize ['11(S)- Lh;(x;)], 
s, x ; 
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subject to 
LS;i+S;o = P; and LS;1+S0i = x1 . 
; i 
But the x1 variables can be eliminated by means of constraints (15), when expressed 
in terms of the S variables. The general form of the resulting location-allocation 
problems is: 
ma~mize [ 'll(S)- thi (~s;;+S0i)J , (16) 
subject to 
LS;1 +S;0 = P;. ; 
(17) 
The above formulation includes most of the existing static facility location models. 
As a special case, if demand is inelastic (that is, S;0 = 0, S0i = 0), '11 is linear, hi(·) 
are made up of a fixed charge plus a linear co>t, it reduces to the standard plant-
location problem (provided nonnegativity restrictions for Sare introduced). If, 
however, '11 is built in such a way that a spatial-interaction model is induced for the 
optimal S, then problem (16)-(17) includes most spatial-interaction based location-
allocation models. 
The most useful property of such a formulation is that the spatial-interaction 
model need not be introduced explicitly in the objective function or in the constraints. 
It is 'embedded' by the optimization, and it holds for the optimal point, although it 
is not required to hold in the whole of the feasible region. The above two devices, 
the embedding property and the widening of the feasible region, are the main • 
reasons that models of the type given by problem (16)-(17) are computationally 
attractive and successful. The embedding approach had been introduced first by 
Coelho and Wilson (1976), and its close relationships with earlier works and problems 
were soon realized (Harris, 1964; Lakshmanan and Hansen, 1965; Huff, 1966; 
Leonardi, 1973). Among its recent developments, the most promising ones for 
further research seem to be the extention to more complex systems of spatially-
interacting urban activities (Wilson, 1978 ; Wilson and Macgill, 1979; Leonardi, 
1979a; Macgill and Wilson, 1979) with the possible inclusion of the transport 
network optimization (Boyce and Southworth, 1979; Boyce and LeBlanc, 1979). 
There is, however, a general criticism to be made to most of the works referred to 
above. Although much theoretical insight has been gained by developing sound 
economical interpretations for the proposed spatial-interaction embedding objective 
functions (Neuburger, 1971 ; McFadden, l 974a; l 974b; Williams, 1977), most of the 
cost functions introduced in the models seem too simple and unrealistic; namely, 
they are usually simple linear functions, which, of course, cannot account for any 
economy-of-scale effect. In this respect, the traditional plant-location problems seem 
much more realistic, whether they introduce the scale effect by a nonsmooth fixed-
charge cost function , thus making it a combinatorial programming problem, or they 
use a smooth concave cost function. The need is felt, therefore, to develop new 
models, which share both the realistic features of the spatial-interaction embedding 
functions , and the realistic features of the concave (possibly nonsmooth) cost 
functions. Some attempts have been made already in this direction, by introducing 
general concave functions, such as in Jacobsen and Kessel (1977), or by means of 
concave power functions, as in Leonardi ( 1978; l 979a), or fixed charges and 
combinatorial structures, as in Hodgson (1978), Beaumont (1979), and Leonardi 
(1980). This strand of research seems a most promising one, as it promotes 
reconciliation between the two 'schools' (the OR approach and the spatial-interaction 
1022 G Leonardi 
approach), and it yields more useful models for real planning problems. It is, 
therefore, a leading topic for the second part of this paper, as well as for further 
research within the Public Facility Location Task. 
2.4.5 An overview of the relationships among static facility-location models. It is 
worthwhile at this point to stop and to look back at what has been discussed, 
before introducing new topics. An overall picture of the links among assumptions 
and models is shown in figure 12. Basically, three broad families of location models 
have been found (the rounded boxes at the bottom of the diagram): 
1. The plant-location and related linear models. Although these are borrowed from 
private-sector location problems, they have been shown to be useful for some public 
service location problems as well, such as, delivery systems and emergency services. 
Their use for some users-attracting systems (such as primary schools) has also been 
found, although the soundness of this approach is not warranted. 
2. The spatial-interaction embedding models. These have been developed mainly in 
the fields of regional science and urban planning and are still waiting for further 
development. Although their beginning has been in retail location problems (Harris, 
1964), they seem to be a general tool to model all users' attracting systems, and 
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Figure 12. A summary of the main relationships among different location models. 
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their use for public facility location has probably more justifications than their 
original use in the retail sector (since they are based on users' benefit maximizing, 
rather than on a producer's profit maximizing). 
1023 
3. The models which do not belong either to 1 or 2. These models are a minority in 
the literature , and most of them were probably produced because of lack of insight 
into their economical justifications. There are, however, a few exceptions which 
deserve further attention, since they seem to pose some new meaningful and 
challenging issues for future research. Some examples are the work of Hanjoul (1980) 
on the disaggregate analysis of users' utility functions and preference orders; of 
Hansen et al ( 1979) on the introduction of pricing policies in locational decisions ; of 
Hansen and Thisse (1980) on the introduction of voting procedures in locational 
decisions; and of Stahl ( 1980) on locational patterns arising from imperfect users' 
information. 
Underlying these three broad families of models , a hierarchy of assumptions (the 
square boxes in figure 12) can be built, each path in the hierarchy leading to just one 
of the sets of models. The following five hierarchical levels can be seen. From top 
to bottom they are : 
( 1) An assumption on who decides location and size of facilities. (By the definition 
of a public facility location, this decisionmaker can only be a public authority.) 
(2) An assumption on who decides demand allocation to facilities. (This is the very 
start of possible branchings, leading to different models.) 
(3) An assumption on users' behavior in choosing facilities. 
( 4) An assumption on the existence of an overall users' benefit function. 
(5) An assumption on the consistency between public authority goals and users' goals. 
Various combinations of different answers to the questions posed in the assumptions 
above lead to different models, as is also shown in figure 12. 
Another useful property for a unifying framework is revealed by the dotted-line 
at the bottom of figure 12. All the existing models seem to include the linear plant-
location model as a special limiting case. This property holds true for the spatial-
interaction embedding models (Leonardi, 1980), and it is rooted in an earlier well-
known result (Evans, 1973). Some care, however, should be taken when stating 
that this always holds true for the third kind of models (the rounded box on the 
right-hand side of figure 12), although this can be shown for some meaningful cases 
(Hodgson, 1978; Hanjoul, 1980). Anyway, this limiting property has to be 
recommended as a criterion for choosing between good and bad models, since usually 
models which do not meet it are easily found to have some inconsistency in theory 
and formulation. 
2.5 Towards more general space-time structures 
2.5.1 Introduction. Altho1.1gh the problems of locating different interacting 
activities and of dynamic (multistage) optimization have been mentioned, the general 
framework developed so far is mainly a static single-service one. This reflects the 
state of the existing literature, which is mainly concerned with static single-service 
location problems. It is felt, however, that the future of location planning tools is in 
dynamic multiservice (or multiactivity) location models . 
The reason for multiservice systems becomes apparent if, for instance, the 
assumption of home-based return trips is dropped, and more general multiple-
destination trips are allowed for the users. Multiple trips link all services and 
activities together (including residence), and a public decision on how to optimally 
locate them has to take these links into account. The reason for a dynamical 
formulation becomes apparent when it is realized that services have to be located in 
a built environment, where the facilities are already existing. Most static location 
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models are very unrealistic in this respect, as they seem to assume that everything 
has to be built from scratch, except demand locations and sizes. But the real urban 
management problem has to deal with existing physical stocks of facilities, which 
means that capacity expansion, demolition, and relocation, rather than simple-minded 
optimal location, are the meaningful decisions. Of course, a dynamic framework is 
required for such decisions, since the urban manager has to take into account both 
the past (the current demand and stock of facilities) and the future (demand changes 
and influence of changes in current stock on future demand-facility interaction). 
The above stated problems cannot be treated with the same detail used for static 
facility location problems, since they need a substantial amount of new theoretical 
and empirical research, which has still to be carried out . Only an outline will be 
given here for some of the possible issues for future research programs, with no claim 
of exhaustiveness. 
2.5.2 The multiactivity location problem. The multiactivity location problem dates 
back as far as Koopmans and Beckmann's (1957) paper, for a normative approach, 
and to Lowry's (1964) paper, for a descriptive approach. The simple, and yet 
powerful, Lowry framework has been given a mathematical-programming interpretation 
by Coehlo and Williams (1978), Wilson (1978), Leonardi (1979a), Macgill and Wilson 
(1979), and Shmulyan (1980), thus leading towards its possible use as an explicitly 
normative tool. Building on the above mentioned references, a possible multiactivity 
generalization of the model given by problem (16)-(17) is as follows: 
ma~mize ['IT(S)- 1~hf (~st+st1)] , (18) 
subject to 
L:st+S7o =Pi"+ LarkLS/1, 
I r I 
(19) 
where all variables and functions are defined in sections 2.4.3 and 2.4.4, except for 
the superscripts k and r, labeling different activities, and ark , the ratio of k-activity 
demand to r-activity demand. Sometimes (but not necessarily) the ark coefficients 
can be interpreted as transition probabilities. More generally , the [ark] array 
introduces a line~r technology tying all activities together; in this sense, constraints 
( 19) can be interpreted as some kind of spatial breakdown of an input-output-like 
model. Indeed, if summation over i is taken on both sides of constraints ( 19), the 
following set of equations is obtained: 
(20) 
where Qk is the total actual (satisfied) demand for activity k, Qk = ti.st/ ; and Yk is 
the difference between the potential demand for activity k originating in demand 
residences and the unsatisfied demand for activity k, Yk = °l;.(Pf - S70 ) . If the 
following vector and matrix notation is introduced : 1 
Y = [Yk] , 
then equations (20) become 
Q = Y+QA, 
and its explicit solution, for Y given, is: 
Q = Y(l-Af1 • 
(21) 
(22) 
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The resemblance of equation (22) to the general solution of an input-output model 
thus becomes evident. But the main interesting feature of equation (22) is that, 
unlike in the usual input-output case, the total demand vector Y is not given. 
Because of its definition, it depends on unsatisfied demand, which in turn depends on 
the accessibility-sensitive demand generation mechanism. This means that the total 
demand vector is affected by the spatial-interaction process. This is a warning for 
every top-to-bottom resource allocation procedure: feedbacks come from the 
bottom, and different locational policies may require changes in higher-level resource 
allocation policies. 
2.5.3 The dynamic-location problem. The dynamic-location problem was first 
introduced in Manne (1967), in a mainly private-sector oriented fashion. It was 
further extensively reviewed by Scott (1971 ), Sheppard (1974), and Erlenkotter 
(1979). A new operational approach for solving dynamic-location problems has 
recently been developed by van Roy and Erlenkotter ( 1980). The trouble is, that all 
these works refer to linear objective functions, and no spatial-interaction behavior is 
taken into account . Moreover, they are mainly oriented towards capacity expansion 
for growing demand in a finite time horizon [although this assumption has been 
relaxed to some extent recently, see van Roy and Erlenkotter (1980)]. On the other 
hand, in most developed countries urban managers are faced with problems of fast 
fluctuating (sometimes declining) demand, the fluctuations taking place over time, 
space (because of migrations and residential mobility), and kind of services. (For 
instance, although totaJ high school demand is usually growing everywhere, 
specializations required from the labor market may change over time.) At the same 
time, the average life of urban stocks is usually very long, and decisions on expansion, 
demolition, and relocation are forced to be slower than the demand-changing process. 
If a rephrasing of the dynamic location problems in terms of classical operations 
research model forms is attempted, one might say that, whereas the capacity-
expansion oriented approach raises a mainly job-scheduling problem, the urban stocks 
management approach raises mainly an inventory problem. This difference leads to 
two very different ways of defining an optimal policy, as well as two very different 
planning philosophies: 
I. For finite-horizon capacity expansion, an optimal policy is a project; that is, a 
list of facilities to be opened and closed at each time period. 
2. For unbounded-horizon urban stock management, an optimal policy is an inventory 
rule; that is, a rule which, given the current knowledge of actual demand, its possible 
forecasts, and the current stock levels in each location, determines the best way these 
stock levels should be changed. 
Thus, whereas in approach I the main concern will be how much, where, and when to 
build, approach 2 will lead io problems such as uncertainty over future demand, 
adaptive updating mechanisms, and monitoring indicators for changes in the system 
requiring new decisions. The modeling of such systems will not be attempted here, 
but it is one of the expected results of future research. 
The second part of the paper will describe mathematical models for static, single-
service, facility location problems and their possible extensions and improvements. 
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Abstract. Titis second part of the paper describes mathematical models for static, single-service, 
facility location problems and their possible extensions and improvements. The first part that 
appeared in the last issue (pages I 00 I -1028) gave a nontechnical description of the proposed general 
framework for analyzing location problems. 
3 Some unifying proposals for static facility location models 
3.l Introduction 
This section explores the properties and the possible solution methods for problem 
(16)-( 17): 
max~mize [ 'l'(S)- ~ h; ~Si;+ So;] , (16) 
subject to 
I si1 + siO = Pi , (17) i 
in the special case when a spatial-interaction model given in equation (I) holds, that is, 
Si/ = GJ(Ci;)WJ'2;.f(Ci;)W;, and the space-discount function is a negative exponential. 
I 
It has been shown by Neuburger ( 1971) that the spatial-interaction embedding function 
for these models has the general form 
l 
'l'(S) = --{3 L Si; logSi; - LSi; Ci/ , (23) 
i,j I/ 
where {3 is the space discount factor. Neuburger also shows that, if the spatial inter-
action model is looked at as a demand function (transport costs €1; being the prices), 
then function (23) can be interpreted as the consumers' surplus associated with the 
allocation matrix [S;;] and the travel cost matrix [ C;; ]. The function defined by 
equation (23) is therefore the most natural measure of users' benefit, consistent with 
the assumed spatial-interaction behavior, and the best suited evaluation criterion for a 
public decisionmaker. Function (23) is also related to Wilson's entropy function 
(Wilson, 1970), although, as Neuburger points out, the analogy is only formal and no 
deep meaning should be sought in it. 
It will be noticed in equation (23) that, if {3 -+ oo, then 'l'(S) reduces to a simple 
linear total transport cost term. Therefore, linear problems of the plant-location 
type are included in equation (23) as special cases. 
The aim of the next sections is both to review the main existing formulations of the 
spatial-interaction embedding location problems, and to propose new possible models. 
The exposition will be in order of increasing complexity, starting with the simplest 
case of inelastic-demand linear-budget constrained models, and gradually introducing 
elastic demand, existing stock, and nonlinear cost functions. All the problems are 
formulated in the first standard form discussed in section 2.4.2 of part r of the paper 
(pages I 016-1017), that is, maximizing users' benefit subject to a constraint on total 
budget. 
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3.2 Linear budget constraints 
3.2.1 The fixed demand case. If a Neuburger consumer surplus function of the form 
(23) is assumed as a measure of users' benefit, and if the cost for establishing and 
running the facilities are linear functions of the form: 
h1(Xj) =a/ Xj +bl , 
where 
h1(x1) is the total cost for a facility of size (capacity) x1 in location j, 
a1 is the cost per unit size in location j, and 
b1 is the fixed (size-independent) cost to be paid for opening a facility in j. 
Then the general location model with fixed total demand assumes the following 
form: 
1 
minimize -
13 
I I s,1 logS,1 + } I s,1 c,1 , S,L,X i /EL 'f /EL 
subject to 
I s,1 = P, • Is,, .;;;; x1 • i E L , /EL I 
L(a1x1+b1).;;;;B, x1 ~o. jEL, /EL 
(the c..,,1straints S11 ;;;.. 0 are not needed, since the objective function is not defined 
for negative values), where 
labels the demand locations, which are given; 
j labels the locations of facilities; 
L is the subset of chosen facility locations, among all possible given locations; the 
subset L is not given, but it has to be determined by optimization; 
S11 is the flow of users from demand location i to facility j, for j E L (here only 
users-attracting systems are considered); 
P1 is the total demand in location i; 
C11 is the cost of a trip from demand location i to facility in location j; 
x1 is the size of the facility in location j, for j E L; and 
B is the total budget available for establishing and running all the facilities. 
The problem of choosing the subset L induces combinatorial features in the above 
mathematical program. If, as a special case, (3 ....,. co, the first term in the objective 
function disappears, and the above problem becomes: 
mininlize L L s,1 C11 , S,L, X I /EL 
subject to 
L S11 = P,' IS11 .;;;; x,' j EL; 
/EL I 
I<a1x1+b1).;;;;B, x1 ;;;..o, s,,~o. /EL j EL. 
(Now the constraints S11 ~ 0 are needed.) 
Since there is no need to maintain unused capacity, when the budget constraint is 
binding (the most sensible case) it will also be: 
x1 = I s,1 , i E L . I 
That is, the total capacity of the facility in location j is set equal to the total demand 
attracted in j. The variables x1 can thus be eliminated, and the resulting location 
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problem , containing the variables S;; and the subset L only, is as follows: 
minimize I I S;; C;; , 
S,L i j E L 
subject to 
IS;;= P;' 
jEL 
I (a x · + b ·) = B j E L I I I ' 
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The above problem is the standard budget-constrained location problem found in the 
operations research literature (ReVelle et al, 1970; ReVelle and Rojeski , 1970; 
Hansen and Kaufman , 1976). It has thus been shown how, when the spatial discount 
rate (3 tends to infinity , the spatial-interaction-based location model tends to the 
plant-location model , and the induced limiting form in users' behavior follows the 
nearest-facility allocation rule. 
In the most meaningful cases, however, (3 will not take the value infinity , and the 
plant-location models cannot be used. The resulting nonlinear combinatorial problems 
are discussed in Leonardi ( 1980), and results are forthcoming on efficient algorithms 
to solve these problems and make sensitivity analysis on the space discount rate and 
the budget level. 
However, without going into the technical details of the algorithmic problems 
(which are outside of the scope of this paper), much insight can be gained in under-
standing the structure of the spatial-interaction-based location model, if its combinatorial 
part (that is, the set L) is held constant. If L is given, it can be dropped from the 
list of control variables, and the problem can be rewritten as 
I 
minimize {j IS;; logS;; + IS;; C;; , (24) 
s,x ;.; i./ 
subject to 
IS;;= P;' 
; 
LS;; ~ X; ' 
i 
X;;;;, 0, 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
where R , R = B - L b1· , is the remaining budget after the fixed costs for opening j E L 
the facilities have been deduced; with no loss of generality, R will also be called 'the 
budget' from now on. 
Problem (24)-(28) is a convex programming problem with linear constraints. [It can 
be easily shown that the objective function (24) is convex .] It therefore has a 
unique optimal solution, and the Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions are necessary 
and sufficient to identify it . The special structure of the objective function, 
together with the simplicity of the constraints, makes it possible to find explicit 
closed-form solutions for the flow variables S;1 and for the facility sizes x1, and to 
analyze the sensitivity to changes on the budget level R. Three cases can be given: 
(a) The budget is more than is needed, so that constraint (27) is not binding. 
(b) The budget is scarce, but sufficient to satisfy all the required capacity, so that 
constraint (27) is binding. 
(c) The budget is not enough to satisfy all the required capacity, so that no solution 
to inequalities (26) can be found. 
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In the first case constraint (27) can be dropped, and also constraints (26) and (28) 
lose meaning. The optimal values for the flow variables S;1 are the solution to the 
following mathematical programming problem. 
I 
minimize Ii L S11 logS11 + ) s,, c,1 , (29) 
,... i,/ 'if 
subject to 
LSi/ = P;. (30) 
I 
By means of the standard Lagrange-multipliers method, one can easily obtain for the 
optimal S11 : 
- - _&_ 
s,, - p1Lf;1 ' 
I 
(31) 
where 
(32) 
The conditions can now be stated under which expression (31) is actually the 
solution to problem (24)-(28). The total size of the facility in j must not be less 
than the total demand attracted in j, so that its minimum feasible value is 
x1 = LS11 = LP1: 1f,1 • (33) 
I I L... if 
I 
From exp~ssion (33) it follows that the total cost of the location plan cannot be 
less than R, where 
R. = I:a1x1 . (34) I 
Thus, if R ;;;. R, x1 as computed !!_om expression (33) is an optimal solution to 
problem (24)-(28); and if, R < R, the budget constraint becomes binding and can 
no longer be neglected. 
The second case, where R < R, applies when the budget satisfies the inequalities (f Pi) (m}n a1) .;;; R < R, (35) 
where R is given by expression (34). The meaning of the left-hand side of condition 
(35) is as follows: the lowest cost solution is to locate just one big facility in the 
cheapest location, regardless of travel costs for the users. It is required that the 
budget be not less than the cost of the lowest cost solution. 
Because of condition (35), constraint (27) is now binding, so that it is always a 
strict equality. This will be true for constraints (26) as well, since a slack capacity 
in the facilities could only be afforded if one had an excess budget, or if R > R, 
which contradicts condition (35). 
The x1 variables can be eliminated, since the size of each facility is equal to the 
number of users it attracts. Problem (24)-(28) reduces to 
I 
minimize aI s,, 1ogs1, + > s,, c11 , 
I' I,/ 'if 
subject to 
tS11 = P1 , 
I:a1I:s,1 = R, I t 
(36) 
(37) 
(38) 
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and use of the Lagrange-multiplier technique yields for the general solution 
!,·· exp(-Afi ·) 
sij = p I/ I ' 
Lfi; exp (-Ni;) 
j 
where A. is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint (38) . 
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(39) 
A comparison of expressions (39) and (31) shows that expression (31) reduces to 
expression (39) if A. = 0. The term exp (-Ni;) can thus be considered as a special 
attraction weight for each location, attractiveness decreasing with unit cost in the 
location . Each location has a different attraction weight and only when the budget 
constraint is not binding, that is when A. = 0, will all locations have equal weights. 
One remark is perhaps needed on these attractiveness weights. From the way they 
are built, one might argue that prices b; are charged to the users. But no pricing 
policy is assumed here . Constraints (26) have been dropped by reason of algebraic 
manipulation only, but they are still acting. What users perceive is the capacity 
offered in j, x;, and not the unit cost b;, whlch is paid by the public decisionmaker. 
Thus, in spite of how it looks, expression (39) arises from a doubly constrained 
spatial-interaction behavior. 
It is usefol to analyze the size of the facilities as a function of A., in order to find 
the sensitivity of the solution to changes in the available budget. Let us make the 
following definition: 
f . · exp (-Ni1) 
x;(A.) = L.si; = "f.Pi '' , 
i i Lfi; exp(-Afi;) 
; 
It can be shown that the derivative of expression ( 40) is given by 
where Si; and X; are given by expressions (39) and ( 40), and ai is defined by 
'[_Si; a; 
a-=_, __ 
I pi 
that is, the average unit cost weighted by the flows coming from location i. 
Derivatives ( 41) vanish if 
"f.ii;S;; 
a;=~ , 
L.1... ij 
i 
and, if equation ( 42) has a solution, convexity of expression (36) assures it is an 
optimal one for problem (36)-(38). 
Other easily found results are 
X;(O) = X; , 
{
LPi, if a; = minak, 
X;(oo) = i k 
0 , if a; > min ak , 
k 
xi(O) ~ p, t},; (~;,~' -•;) . 
(40) 
(41) 
(42) 
(43) 
(44) 
(45) 
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The above quantities can be used to classify locations into three main groups: 
1. If xj(O) > 0 and ai = min ak, the graph of the function xi(A.) has the shape 
k 
shown in figure 13. That is, the size of the facility in the location with minimum 
cost is increasing with A., and it attracts all the demand in the limit when A. -+ 00 and 
R approaches the value of the left-hand side of constraint (35). In other words, 
when resources become scarce, the location cost becomes the main criterion to decide 
on size and location, and the optimal solution tends to concentrate in one single 
location (namely, the cheapest one). 
2. If xj(O) > 0 and ai > min ak, the graph of the function xj(A.) has the shape 
k 
shown in figure 14. Equation (42) has a finite solution A.* so that the size xi rises 
to a maximum xt for 0 < A. ~ A.*, and then falls again for A. > A.•. In other words, 
for this kind of location there is a threshold value for the budget, above which it is 
convenient to increase the size of the facility there, and below which the facility 
must be abandoned in favor of cheaper locations. 
3. If xj(O) < 0 and ai > min ak, the graph of the function xi(A.) is shaped as in 
k 
figure 15. Equation (42) has no finite solution in this case, so that the size xi 
decreases monotonically with A.. This is clearly the worst kind of location, as far as 
scarce resources are concerned. The size of the facility there decreases for any 
decrease in the budget. 
The previous analysis, simple as it is, reveals two facts: 
(a) Even with linear costs (that is, with no scale economies) concentration effects can 
be caused by low budgets. This is mainly a result of the doubly constrained nature 
of the model, and in particular of constraint (26), requiring demand not exceeding 
capacity for each facility. 
L~1---~~~~--======~~~~ 
; 
0 A 
Figure 13. Size of facility as a function of the 
budget multiplier. Case 1: cheapest location. 
XI 
x/ 
XI 
0 
">..' A 
Figure 14. Size of facility as a function of the 
budget multiplier. Case 2: intermediate-cost 
location. 
Figure IS. Size of facility as a function of the budget multiplier. Case 3: high-cost location. 
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(b) There is nothing like a fixed hierarchy among the sizes in each location. Changes 
in the total budget can tum the distribution of facilities upside down, so that what 
seemed to be a good location may be abandoned and what seemed to be a bad 
location may be chosen. 
Parametric formulas ( 40) can be used quite easily to get actual numerical solutions, 
and these can be used to build up the total cost function : 
T(X) = La1x1(X), (46) 
I 
which can be easily shown to be monotonically nonincreasing for X ;;;,, 0 and such 
that T(O) = R, and T(oo) = (~in ak) f Pi. where R is defined by expression (34). 
[The graph of T(X) is shown in figure 16.] Provided the actual budget R satisfies 
inequality (35), the optimal value of the multiplier X is the root of 
T(X) = R, 
which can be quite easily solved by numerical methods. 
In the third case one has: 
0 ~R < (mjnak) tP;, 
(47) 
(48) 
that is, the budget is not even enough to concentrate all the demand in the cheapest 
zone. As can be seen in figure 16 there is no real solution to equation ( 47) in the 
region defined by expression ( 48), that is, the feasible set of problem (24)-(28) is 
empty. In actual applications, what one can do in this case is either to increase the 
budget or to slacken condition (26) by allowing for some overcrowding in the 
facilities. This can be done by formulating the mathematical programming problem: 
1 
minimize -(3 ~ S;1 logS;1 + t: S;1 C;1 , ~I v 
subject to 
LS11 =Pi, 
I 
LS11 = PXJ, 
I 
(49) 
(50) 
(51) 
(52) 
(53) 
where p is the maximum allowable density, as measured by the ratio of the number 
of users to facility size. Problem (49)-(53) can be reduced to the same form as 
T 
T(;\) 
R- -
<min a.>IP, 
• __:_'-+~~~-+-~~~__:::::::::::==~~~-
Figure 16. Total cost as a function of the budget multiplier. 
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problem (36) - (38). If one eliminates the x1 variables by means of constraint (51) 
and defines aj = a1/ p, one gets the problem 
I 
minimize 73 L S;1 logS11 + L S;1 C;; , i,J I,/ (54) 
subject to 
LS11 = P,, 
i 
(55) 
Iaj LS;i = R, 
I I 
(56) 
which is the same as problem (36)-(39), if ai is replaced by aj. 
A common question to be asked in applications is how large the density p must be 
in order to meet the budget constraint. The minimum value of p can be found by 
imposing the condition 
R ;;;;. (IP,) min~ , 
I j p 
(57) 
which ensures a nonempty feasible set. Solving for p gives 
aiLP; 
p;;;;. min+-
1 
(58) 
The right-hand term of expression (58) is the ratio between the cost of establishing a 
facility large enough to have no congestion and the actual resources one can use to 
establish the facility. When this ratio is greater than one even in the cheapest 
location, it gives a measure of the least trade-off that is necessary between congestion 
and resources. 
3.2.2 Elastic demand case . It will now be shown how a special form of demand 
sensitiveness to accessibility can be introduced, which is consistent with a general 
Neuburger consumer surplus function. 
The proposed general form is: 
minimizei[IcP1 -G;)log(P,-G;)+ LS;1 1ogS;1+ L(P;-G;)C;o+ LS;1c11], (59) 
I' i if I if 
subject to 
LS;; = G;, 
I 
Ia1x1 .;;; R, i 
Xj;;;;, 0, 
(60) 
(61) 
(62) 
(the implicit constraints S;1 ;;;;. 0 and G1 .;;; P, are automatically accounted for by the 
form of the objective function) where the definitions of the variables are the same as 
for the fixed-demand model (24)-(28), except for the new ones: 
G; is the total actual demand in i (not fixed, but to be found); and 
C;o is a parameter which can be interpreted as the 'cost' associated with having no 
destination, that is, not being a user of any facility. 
It must be stressed that, unlike in the fixed demand model, here the total actual 
demand which will be generated in each demand location is not fixed and known in 
advance, but has to be determined as a function of the offered service itself. 
However, it is still assumed that an upper bound P; is known for the demand in 
location i, and actual demand G1 will be generally less than P1• This upper bound 
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can be interpreted as the potential demand in i, that is, the demand which would be 
generated with infinite accessibility to the service. The special form of the 'entropy' 
term in the objective function (59) has been adopted to embed both the flow (or 
allocation) variables S;i and the generated demands G1• 
The elastic demand assumption is probably not the best suited one for those 
services which satisfy real needs (for instance, primary schools or emergency medical 
care). It is certainly sound in many other services, however, such as high schools, 
libraries, recreational services, and also some health care facilities such as hospitals. 
In analogy with the fixed demand model, it can be shown how problem (59)-(62) 
is a general formulation which includes other models as special cases. If, for example, 
only all-or-nothing values for the xi variables and nearest-facility allocations are 
allowed, one obtains a special form of the price-sensitive demand location models 
discussed in Wagner and Falkson (197 5) and in Erlenkotter (1977). It is shown in 
these references how some changes of variables bring this problem back to the 
standard form of the plant-location model, so that the usual algorithms can be used. 
Let us now go back to the more general model (59)-(62), and make a very simple, 
but fundamental observation. 
From the definition of the variables S;o = P; - G;, the assumption a0 = 0, and 
with summations over j starting from 0, it is easily seen that problem (59)-(62) is 
equivalent to the following problem: 
1 
minimize Ii l S;i 1ogS1i + ~Sii Ci/ , 
tJ l,J I/ 
subject to 
LS1j = P;, 
I 
A comparison with problem (24)-(28) shows that the two problems are completely 
identical. What has been done is to introduce a dummy location, labeled by j = 0, 
where a dummy facility will be located at no cost. The dummy facility will be made 
big enough to serve all the potential demand which is not served by the real facilities. 
The above observation means that all the theoretical and computational problems 
related to model (59)-(62) can be solved by the same approaches developed for the 
fixed-demand model, except for only slight changes. However, the main results will 
be restated in new terms for convenience. In what follows, summations over j will 
be again with j =I= 0. 
The following definitions are made: 
wi = exp(-Xai) the attraction weight in location j (where Xis the Lagrange multiplier 
for the budget constraint); 
f;o = exp(-(3C;0 ) where C;o are given constants; 
f;i = exp(-(3C;1) the exponential decay factor for a travel cost C1i; and 
¢; = l;.f;iwi the Hansen (1959) measure of accessibility to the service from the 
1 demand point i. 
Then one has : 
¢; 
G; = P;¢;+f;o , (63) 
- ftj Wt 
S;1 - G; ¢1 , (64) 
W · 
xi= Ls,i = ,i,'L GJ;j. 
l '+'I I 
(65) 
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From function (63) it can be seen how the elastic demand assumption works. The 
total actual demand generated in i, G;, is a function of the accessibility to the service 
from i; it is zero for zero accessibility (which means no available facilities) and 
tends to the total potential demand P; for infinite accessibility. The shape of 
function ( 63) is shown in figure 17, which should be compared with figure 18 
(which is the same as figure 7 in part I of the paper). 
We conclude this section by noting that, unlike in the fixed demand case, here the 
feasible region is nonempty for any R :;;;;., 0, since the unsatisfied potential demand is 
automatically pushed out of the system by the elastic-demand mechanism implied by 
function (63). 
3.2.3 Models without capacity constraints. It has already been stressed that the 
models discussed in 3.2. I and 3.2.2 are doubly constrained, because they have 
constraints both on the total demand coming from each location and on the total 
number of users that can be served at each location. Equality between attracted 
demand and available capacity in each location is always !"equired. If this assumption 
is dropped, another family of location models is obtained. These models, first 
introduced for the location of retail trade (Harris, 1964; Lakshmanan and Hansen, 
1965; Huff, 1964; 1966) assume that the users' behavior is described by a spatial-
interaction model with no constraints on the destinations, where the attractiveness of 
the facilities is measured by a nondecreasing function of their size (usually a power 
function). Although these models were mainly used for retail trade location, it is 
argued that they might be useful for some kinds of public services too . 
Recently, mathematical programming formulations, related to the ones already 
discussed in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, have been developed for these models. They 
are briefly discussed here. 
G, 
0 
Figure 17. Total demand in i as a function of accessibility. 
potential demand, P 
ID.aximum demand, P 
0 f(O) 
Hansen accessibility, A 
Figure 18. An accessibility-increasing demand curve. 
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The usual general form for these models is (Coelho and Wilson, 197 6): 
maximize ?:S;1 (~(3logx1 -C;1)--(31 ?:S;1logS;1 , (66) s,x 1,/ 1,/ 
subject to 
LS;; = P;' 
I 
l_a;x; = R, 
I 
Xj;;:;. Q. 
(67) 
(68) 
(69) 
Another form which has been shown to be equivalent to model (66)-(69) and which 
contains the x; variables only, is given by Leonardi (1973; 1978): 
maximize l_P;logl_xjexp(-(3C;1), (70) 
X I I 
subject to 
l_a1x1 = R, I 
x,;;:;. 0. 
In both cases, the general solution must satisfy the conditions (see the quoted 
references for the proof): 
LS·1 
; i x,a; 
l_P, =R' 
I 
(71) 
(72) 
(73) 
where s,1 is the flow of users from i to j, and is given by the following production-
constrained spatial-interaction model: 
x'f exp(-(3C1;) s.. = P.-="--'-'---"---
I/ 'l_x'fexp(-(3C11 ) 
I 
(74) 
Condition (73) states that the budget must be allocated to locations in proportion 
to the total demand they attract. This balancing principle, more or less explicitly 
states, has been widely used over a long period of time. A recent review of the 
concept, its applications, and extensions can be found in Harris and Wilson (1978). 
Equations (73) can be easily solved by a first-order iteration technique over the x1. 
It is interesting to compare the main features of problem (66)-(69) with the ones 
of problem (23)-(27). In the more meaningful case the equality holds in expression 
(35), so that for problem (23)-(27) one has that l;.S;; = x1. But this condition will l 
never be like equations (73), unless R = 2;.P; and all a1 are equal, that is, there are 
no differences among the location costs. 1 
Another important difference is found in the sensitivity of the relative size of 
facilities to changes in the budget. Indeed, model (66)-(69) is easily seen not to be 
sensitive at all, since it keeps the same relative distribution of sizes and locations for 
all the possible budget values, and no concentration occurs because of the scarcity of 
resources. 
3.2.4 Optimal location with a partially existing stock. In the models discussed in the 
preceding sections no distinction is made between different types of costs. A general 
overall unit cost is assumed for the facilities, which will possibly include both building 
and running costs. Also, it is assumed that both costs are always met for every 
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facility; this is the same as assuming that new facilities are always built and no 
account is taken of existing ones, if any. 
In a more realistic setting, however, locational decisions are made based on an 
already built environment, where an existing stock of facilities is usually available. 
In the more general case, decisions have to be made on expanding the existing 
capacity by building new facilities, by using part of the existing capacity, and by 
closing down some of the existing facilities. Each one of these actions implies 
different kinds of costs, and in what follows an attempt will be made to take this 
into account. 
It should also be stressed beforehand that location problems with partially existing 
facilities lead naturally to dynamic formulations. The models discussed in this 
section can thus be looked upon as a first step towards dynamic generalizations. The 
third kind of costs (demolition costs) will not be introduced, since demolition is only 
justified in a fully dynamic formulation of the problem. However, most of the 
results can be easily generalized in order to account for this problem if the option of 
demolishing part of the unused capacity is added. 
Two main models are proposed: the first with charges added that are a simple 
linear function of building costs, and the second with fixed charges in building costs 
added. 
1. For a linear function of building costs, and with a general objective function as in 
function (23), one has the problem 
1 
minimize Ii L logS11 + LS;1 C11 , (75) ~I,/ If 
subject to 
Is,, =Pi, 
I 
Is,,~ y1+z1 , I 
~a1(y1 + z1)+ L b1z1 + 'f d1(v; - Y;) ~ R , 
1 I I 
0 ~ YJ < v,, 
0 ~ z,, 
where 
YJ is the existing capacity in use at location j, 
z1 is the newly built capacity in location j, 
v1 is the total existing capacity in location j, 
b1 is the unit building cost in location j, and 
d; is the unit cost for holding unused capacity in location j. 
(76) 
(77) 
(78) 
(79) 
(80) 
The following properties of the general solution to problem (75)-(80) are easily 
proved by means of the Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions. 
(a) The solution always has the form 
if 0 ~ YJ < V1 , 
if YJ = V; . 
That is, it is needless to expand the capacity of the service where the existing one is 
not completely used. 
(b) If for any location j one has d; > a1 then Y; must equal v1. That is, wherever 
holding unused capacity is more costly than using it, the total existing capacity is 
fully used. 
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(c) When constraints (77) and (78) are binding, one has for the flow variables 
-~ Sif - P;" '" ' f....WfJif 
f 
where 
wf = exp(-Auf), 
if 0 ,,;;_ Yf < vf, 
if Yf = vf, 
and A is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint (78). 
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(81) 
(82) 
(d) According to equation (81), the total size of the facility in each location is given by 
(83) 
and one also has 
{
xf' 
Yt = 
vf ' 
(84) 
{
o, 
Z; = X; - V; , 
(85) 
if X; > V;, 
for the old and new stock, respectively. 
As for the simpler model (23)-(27), the solution for nonbinding constraints is 
found by putting A = 0. The minimum value for R under which the feasible set is 
empty can be found by concentrating as much demand as possible in the locations 
with the lowest a1 values (using the existing capacity as much as possible), and the 
remaining demand in the locations with the lowest building costs. 
Formulas (81)-(85) can be usefully compared with formulas (39)-(44) in section 
3.2.1. The general form of the solution is basically the same, the only difference 
being in the cost terms (82). Unfortunately, one does not know a priori the locations 
where constraint (79) is binding on the right side, so that the sensitivity to changes 
in the total budget is less easily analyzed. 
2. For building cost with fixed charges, and with a general objective function as in 
function (23), one has the problem 
1 
minimize -
13 
L Si; logSif + L Sif C1f , (86) if if 
subject to 
LSif = P; ' (87) 
f 
Laf(Yf+z;)+ Lbfzf+ Ldf(vf-Y;)+ Lhfl)f ,,;;_R' 
f f f f 
0 ,,;;_ Yf ,,;;_ vf , 
0 ,,;;_ Z; ,,;;_ M8f' 
8f E { 0, 1}, 
(88) 
(89) 
(90) 
(91) 
(92) 
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where 
h1 is the fixed charge to build new facilities in location j, 
51 is a Boolean variable, which is set to 1 when capacity in j is expanded, and 0 
otherwise, and 
M is a very large number. 
Model (86)-(92) looks very much like model (75)-(80), except for the new costs 
and the 5i variables. Provided the values for the 5i are known, the model has the 
same form and can be treated in the same way. Exact and/or heuristic methods to 
find the optimal 5i values are therefore needed. This can be done with methods 
related to the ones developed for the classical plant-location problem. (The special 
structure of problem (86)-(92) has still to be exploited, however.) This is an area in 
which new research has still to be carried out. 
An elastic-demand version of models (75)-(80) and (86)-(92) can be developed 
with the same approach used in model (66)-(69). If the objective function (66) or 
(70) replaces objective function (75) and constraint (60), it is easily shown that for 
the optimal solution one must have 
{
X(a1 -di)Yi, if Yi<vi, zi=O, l.si, = 
i X(a1 +bi )(vi+ z1) , if Yi = vi , zi > 0 , 
where A. is a Lagrange multiplier. 
3.3 Nonlinear budget constraints 
3.3.1 The basic model. If nonlinear cost functions replace the aixf terms in 
constraints (27), model (24)-(28) assumes the following form: 
1 
minimize a L S;i logS;; + 2: S;; C;i , 
f' i,i if 
subject to 
'[.sii = P;, 
i 
~S;1 .;;;; x1 , 
I 
Lfj(x1) .;;;; R , I 
(93) 
(94) 
(95) 
(96) 
(97) 
where fj(xi) is the cost of a facility of size x1 in location j, with fj(O) = 0. The 
functions fi(·) are assumed to be as smooth as needed and to be concave nondecreasing. 
This means that scale economies are introduced in the model. 
By means of the Lagrange-multiplier method, it is found that the general solution 
to problem (94)-(97) when constraints (96) and (97) are binding satisfies the 
following equations: 
hijWj 
Si/ =P; </>i 
for the flow variables, where by definition 
(98) 
f/(xi) is the first derivative of fj(x1), and A. is the Lagrange multiplier associated with 
constraint (97). 
Equations (97) can be compared with expression (39) for the analogy; however, 
equations (98) are not a closed-form solution, since the right-hand side is a function 
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of the x1 variables. For these one can write the equations 
x1 = Fj(x) 
where 
" , h11 w1 Fj(x) = Ts11 = TP1 t/>; , 
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(99) 
(100) 
and x is the [x1] vector. The right-hand side of (97) can be rearranged in a more 
meaningful way 
p. 
s - I (IOI) 
if - l+B;1exp[Afj(x1)) ' 
where by definition 
" htk ' B;1 = L.. -h exp[-Afk(xk)), 
k *I if 
(102) 
a term which does not depend on x1. Formula (IOI) is a logistic in fj'(·), so that one 
has for the derivatives 
~- -
a - Xg1S;;(P; S;1), x, (103) 
where the g1(x1), g1(x1) = -fi'(x1), are the second derivatives of the cost curves 
multiplied by - I; g( ·) is always nonnegative because of the concavity assumption. 
The derivatives of the functions F1(-) defined by expression (100) are thus given by 
~- " -ax, - Xg;7S;1(P; S;1). (104) 
A further requirement has to be met by the functions fj(·). Of course, one must 
have S11 = 0, if x1 = 0. Formula ( 10 I) shows that this happens only if 
fj(O) = oo, (105) 
that is, the cost curves have to be infinitely steep at the origin. This is a kind of 
smooth version of fixed-charge costs, which introduce scale economies by means of 
an infinitely steep initial jump. When condition (I OS) is not met, one can never have 
a solution with x1 = 0 for some j; the linear-cost models are a particular example of 
this general fact. 
Research has to be carried out to find convenient numerical solution methods for 
formula (99), possibly with special assumptions on the functions fj(·). The simplest 
assumption that can be made is that of constant elasticities, so that the fj(-) will be 
power functions. They can be written in the following form: 
a-x 1-<>t 
fj(x) = ~ , 0 < cxt < I , 
I 
so that 
f;'(x) = a1x-<>t. (106) 
The following set of equations for the variables x1 and the multiplier>.. should be solved: 
_ , h11 exp(-Xatfx'ft) (l07) x1 - L..Pi,. , 1 L.. h11 exp(->..a1/xft) I 
L ~[LP; hi/exp(-Xa1/x'ft) ]I-<>t = R. 
I 1-cxt 1 Lh11 exp(->..a1/x'f1) (!OS) I 
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This approach can be also used to build a nonlinear-cost version of models (66)-(69) 
and (70)-(72), with size-dependent utility functions. One easily obtains for the 
optimal point the conditions 
ts;, x !.' 
-- = .:::.J.:!.L_ 
LP; l:x1f;' ' 
i I 1 
which can be usefully compared with conditions (76). Elastic demand can be 
introduced as in section 3.2.2 and needs no new formal tools. 
However, it must be recalled that the assumption of concavity for the cost 
functions destroys the uniqueness property of solutions to problem (94)-(97), and 
multiple nonoptimal solutions may be found. The usefulness of equations (I 07) and 
(108) for finding numerical solutions is therefore limited, and must still be explored. 
3.3.2 Nonlinear cost functions with partially existing stock. The proposed model is 
analogous to the ones introduced in section 3.2.4: 
1 
minimize Ii I S;; logS;1 + IS;; C;; , 
,... I I 
subject to 
IS;;= P;' 
I 
Is;, .;;;;y,+z,, 
i 
Lfj(Y1+z1)+ Ig1(z1)+ Lh;(v1-y1).;;;; R, I I I 
0 .;;;; Y1 .;;;; vi , 
0.;;;; z,' 
where the variables are defined as in section 3.2.4, and: 
fj(-) is the running-cost function for location j, 
g1( ·) is the building-cost function for location j, 
h1(·) is the unused-capacity-cost function for location j. 
(109) 
(110) 
(111) 
(112) 
(113) 
(114) 
The cost functions are assumed concave nondecreasing, so that scale economies are 
introduced. 
The following properties of the general solution to problem (l 09)-( 114) are easily 
proved. 
(1) The solution always has the form z1 = 0, if 0 .;;;; y1 < v1, and z1 > 0, if Y; = v1, 
as in the linear-cost case. 
(2) If the inequality h1(v1) ;;;-., fj(v1) holds, that is, if the cost for holding the empty 
stock v1 is greater than the cost for using it, then one always has y1 = v1, so that 
location j will always have a facility size at least as great as the existing stock. 
(3) If the inequalities h;(v;) <fj(v1) and hj(O) > fj'(v1) hold, then the equation 
fj(y1)+ h1(v; - Y;) = fj(v1) has a root in (0, v1), where 0 < Yj < v1, and in location j 
we will have either 0 .;;;; y1 .;;;; Yj or Y/ = v1. 
(4) If the inequalities hj(v;) < fj(v1) and hj(O) < fj(v1) hold, in location j one will 
have 0 .;;;; y1 .;;;; v1• (5) When constraints ( 111) and ( 112) are binding, one has for the flow variables 
l/J;jWj 
S;1 = P; 1>1 
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where 
1/1;1 = exp(-/3C;;), (115) 
(116) 
with A. the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (l 12), and x1 the total size 
of the facility in location j. 
If f;(x;) is replaced by µJ<x1) as defined in expression ( 116), equations (99)-(l 04) 
still hold. The necessary condition to have a zero-size facility for some location j is still 
fi(O) = oo' 
and it is interesting to notice that this depends on running costs only. 
Specific instances of the above model can be obtained by introducing explicit 
forms for the cost functions, as in equations (l 06)-( 108). 
3.4 Towards a more general family of location models 
(l 17) 
3.4.1 The general model. The models discussed so far have a rather specialized 
objective function, rooted in the Neuburger consumer surplus maximizing and spatial-
interaction theory. It has been shown that this form is general enough to include 
linear-integer plant-location models as special cases. It has also been shown that the 
introduction of appropriate new variables allows for a particular form of elastic demand. 
A new form is now introduced for the objective function, in which the entropy 
term is replaced by a more general users' benefit function. It is assumed that the 
total benefit is made up of three terms as follows: 
F;1(S;;) a term depending on the flows between i and j only, 
£ 1(G1) a term depending on the total demand coming from i (G1 = L.S11 ), and I 
H1(x1, D1) a term depending on the size of the facility x1 and on the total demand it 
attracts (D; = "i;.S;1). I 
Adding up all the terms over i and ; and subtracting the usual travel cost gives a 
total net benefit function of the following form: 
B = LF';1(S;1)+ LE1(G;)+) H1(x1, D1)-i3LS11 C11 . (118) I/ i I If 
If the objective function (l 18) is introduced into a general-model with partially 
existing stock and nonlinear cost functions, the following mathematical programming 
problem is obtained 
maximize LFi;(S11 )+ LE1(G1)+ 'LH1(y1 +z1, D1)-i3LS11 C11 , (l 19) I.I I I ii 
subject to 
LS11 = G;' (120) 
I 
~s11 = n1 , c121) 
I 
D1,;;;; (Y1 +z1), 
Lfj(Y1 +z,)+ Lg1(z1)+ Lh1(V1 -y,),;;;; R, 
I I I 
0,;;;; YJ, 
Y;,;;;; vi, 
0,;;;; z,' 
(122) 
(123) 
(l 24) 
(125) 
(126) 
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where the usual definitions and assumptions hold. [Constraints (120) and (121) are 
actually redundant, since the variables G; and D1 can be eliminated.] 
It can be shown that the general solution to problem (119)-(126) has the same 
properties as properties (I)-( 4) listed in section 3.3.2. 
3.4.2 An example. Specific instances of model (I I 9)-(126) can be obtained in 
various ways. Here an attempt will be made to show what can be done, with no 
claim of generality. What will be developed is just one of the ways of looking at 
model (I I 9)-(126), which is considered to be useful for some applications. 
Suppose one has : 
1 
-Fi;(S;;) = {iS;; JogS;; , 
the usual entropy term; 
1 
-E1(G1) = {i(P; - G;) log(P1 - G;)+a;, 
a term similar to the one introduced in the elastic demand model (59)-(62), it can 
be interpreted as a cost associated with unsatisfied potential demand; and 
a cost term associated with the deviation between usable capacity and actual demand. 
Then substitution into the objective function (119) yields the mathematical 
programming problem 
I 1 a 
minimize RI S;, Jogs;,+ RI (P; - G;) log(P, - G;)+a I (x, - n,) log(x; - D,) 
P " P I P I . 
subject to 
n, <x,' 
l:Ji(x;)+ 2:K1(z1)+) hj(v; - y1) < R , I I f 
0 ~YJ ~vi, 
0 ~ z,' 
where 
(127) 
(128) 
(129) 
(130) 
(131) 
The constraint (128) is actually redundant if a > 0, but it will be useful to keep it in 
order to obtain the correct form for the limiting cases. Assuming that constraint 
(129) is active and proceeding as usual, one obtains the following results for the 
general solution : 
<Pt 
G;=P;-+,..' 
V; 'Pi 
_ w1 exp(-/3C;1) S11 - G1 ip, , 
(132) 
(133) 
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where 
V; = exp(-(Xz;), 
Wj = exp(cx{3bj)(X1 -D,)°'' 
</>; = I wi exp(-/3C;1). 
I 
For an optimal x one further has 
w1 = exp-[a+ Aµ/xi)] a: exp-Aµ1(x1) 
1103 
(134) 
(135) 
(136) 
where µ1(-) are the functions defined by expression (116). A comparison with some 
earlier results is useful. Equations (132) and (133) look like equations (63) and (64), 
implying that an elastic demand behavior is embedded in the model. Equation (136) 
is basically the same as equation (115). This means that the solution to problem 
(127)-(131) is indistinguishable from the solution to problem (109)-(114), as far as 
the sizes and locations of facilities are concerned. However, a different behavior is 
implied for the users. From equation (134) it is seen that the attraction weight w1 is 
proportional to a power of the difference between capacity and attracted demand, 
and by changing the values of the parameters a and b1 one obtains a different 
sensitivity to the deterrence effect of congestion. As a special case, if it can be 
assumed that Di is always small, compared to x1, and all b1 are equal to b, the 
attractiveness weights are given approximately by w1 "" kxj, with k = exp (cx{3b ). 
This assumption implies that the system never produces congestion, so that one 
obtains models related to the ones discussed in section 3.2.3. If, on the other hand, 
a = 0, the terms in x1 and D1 disappear from the objective function (127), and 
constraint ( 1 28) usually becomes active. The problem thus reduces to an elastic-
demand version of model (109)-(114). 
In short, it is seen that model (127)-(131) yields all the previously discussed 
models as special cases, including models with elastic demand and models with size-
dependent utility functions. Furthermore, when its parameters do not assume 
limiting values, its general solution is fairly flexible in fitting users' behavior, although 
still consistent with the Neuburger consumer surplus formalism. 
4 Concluding comments and issues for further research 
4.1 General comments 
A general framework for future research has been outlined in section 2 (last issue, 
pages I 002-102 5) in broad nontechnical terms. The purpose of this section is to add a 
few technical notes on problems of a less general nature, but of some importance to 
applications. 
Single period (or static), single-level optimal location problems are usually supposed 
to be rather well-known and solvable. However, it can be seen in the preceding 
sections how poorly solved or unsolved problems can still be found. This is even 
more true if the term 'problem' is given a wider meaning than 'optimization problem' 
and the term 'solution' a wider meaning than 'optimal solution' to a possible 
mathematical program. Indeed problems of content, form, and algorithms must be 
solved. 
Problems of content include such topics as physical, behavioral, and economic 
assumptions and interpretations; and consistency between the models and the 
aggregation levels they are used for. Problems of form are concerned with the 
mathematical tools we use to formulate the problems. They range from continuous 
(rather than discrete) to nonlinear (rather than linear) to existence and uniqueness 
analyses. Problems of algorithms are concerned with the best ways to solve , or 
nearly solve, the problems stemming from content and form. Surprisingly enough, it 
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seems as though people working on location problems actually tend to group 
themselves according to the three categories above, with little exchange of information 
among the groups. 
Unification, rather than new models or algorithms, is thus the main need, and 
sections 3.1 to 3.4 in this paper were guided by this idea. However, it must be said 
that unifying features have been sought mainly in the form of problems, whereas 
comments on their content have been kept intentionally vague. This happens mainly 
because the unifying of forms is a relatively easy task , whereas the carrying out of a 
satisfactory analysis of content is the real challenge, and it needs a substantial 
amount of time and effort. 
This is not to say that the models discussed are useless. Indeed, the belief is that 
static, single-level optimal-location problems not falling within these models are in 
some way hard to find. What is needed from now on is just to find where each 
problem falls, and how and why. 
The stress placed on contents does not mean there are no algorithmic problems. 
Actually, the most sensible general-purpose models, like the ones discussed in 
section 3, basically need new algorithms. More than this, they need a lot of effort 
on coordinating both existing and possibly new algorithms. 
As far as the purely formal problems are concerned, if is believed that no really 
new mathematical effort is needed for static, single-level problems. If a change is 
made from static to dynamic and from single to multilevel (or multifacility) problems, 
this is no longer true. However, dynamic multilevel problems fall outside the 
purpose of this paper, and will be the subject of future studies. 
The first two problems posed above are now discussed in greater depth, in order to 
draft a framework for future research. The problem of algorithms is too technical 
for an introductory paper like this. It will be, however, the subject of some forth-
coming work. 
4.2 Content 
An optimal location model is made up of an objective function, some constraints and, 
of course, some decision variables. Since there is no general agreement on what 
these components are, a brief discussion is necessary. For this purpose it is easier to 
take them in reverse order. 
4.2.1 The decision variables. All location problems have size and location of facilities 
among the decision variables. Some of them also have commodity or users'. flows. 
All of them may be different depending on what is meant by 'location', 'facility', and 
'flows'. Because of this it is believed that research effort is needed for the following: 
I. To identify the correct definition of locations for each problem. This issue is 
closely related to the aggregation level problem, and particular care must be placed 
on distinguishing the problems with pointwise locations from the ones where locations 
are zones, or subregions of a region. 
2. To identify the correct definition of facility for each problem. This problem is 
related to the one above, so that the 'size' of a 'facility' in a given location has 
different meanings depending on what the location is. It is usually a plant, a building, 
or a single piece of equipment for pointwise locations, whereas it is an aggregate 
usually of many plants, or of buildings, or of many pieces of equipment in zone-like 
locations. 
3. To identify the correct definition of flows for each problem. As stressed many 
times i:1 sections 2 and 3.1 to 3.4, there is a fundamental difference between problems 
where displacements of goods and people are charged to the users and the ones 
where displacements are controlled by the locational decisionmaker. Whereas in the 
latter case the well known OR plant-location models apply (with possible slight 
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variations for each problem), in the former case models based on spatial-interaction 
theory are needed. Regrettably enough, mistakes are often made in choosing the 
model to be used. Even more regrettable is the tendency of people who like one 
approach to dislike the other one, regardless of the nature of the problem being 
solved. Actually, one needs to know which approach is best suited for each problem, 
and not which is 'good' or 'bad'. 
4.2.2 Th e constraints. A general agreement exists on the main set of typical 
constraints for a location problem. Most of them have an obvious physical meaning 
and need nothing new. The only one requiring further physical and/or economic 
insight is the constraint on total budget<2>. 
This is mainly a problem of defining the costs for a single-period location plan. 
The two main research issues seem to be: 
(a) The problem of defining running and building costs. Most location models pay 
little attention to the difference between cost components which have to be summed 
and discounted over time (running costs for a facility), and the cost components 
found once in a while (building a new or expanding an old facility). Obviously 
enough, this mainly happens because of their static nature . However, since most 
single-period-location models have to be used as steady-state approximations to 
dynamic problems, it may well happen that continuously discounted running costs 
prevail over building costs, as far as locational and/or relocational decision are 
concerned. Therefore a deeper analysis of running-cost components is needed. 
Another issue related to the total cost problem is that of demolition. In many 
location-relocation problems, where decisions have to be taken on existing stock, it 
may be meaningful to ask whether demolition is better than keeping unused stock. 
This problem needs a dynamic setting to be solved; therefore, a deeper analysis of 
this cost component is needed. 
(b) The problem of scale economies. Introducing convex nondecreasing cost 
functions is usually realistic for problems with pointwise locations, where it can be 
certain that 'a facility' is actually a single facility, or plant, or piece of equipment. 
It is not so sensible for problems where locations are zones or subregions, since in 
this case it is not known how the total size allocated to each zone is spread across it, 
how many single facilities it is made up of, how big each single facility is, and so on. 
In this case, linear costs and no fixed charges are probably the best compromise. 
Another issue related to scale economies is the tendency toward concentration that 
these economies usually induce in the models. This is a controversial point, since 
there are people thinking that a few big facilities are the best solution, and those 
thinking that social welfare and equity require evenly distributed facilities across space. 
4.2.3 The objective function. As discussed earlier, different kinds of objective 
functions can be found. Two important ones are: 
(l) Functions where costs (benefits) charged to the locational decisionmaker are 
minimized (maximized). 
(2) Functions where costs (benefits) charged to the users are minimized (maximized). 
Whereas the first kind of function poses no really new problem, the second kind 
does. Provided one accepts the embedding approach, by which maximizing is used 
both to optimize (a decisionmaker's task) and to induce the appropriate users' 
behavior, much can be said about what the appropriate users' behavior is, and how it 
should be embedded in the model. 
(l) In many models there is nothing like a budget constraint, since the total cost is part of the 
objective function. However, there is no difference between the two formulations, as far as the 
meaning of the cost functions is concerned. 
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The models which embed the logit-choice behavior are particularly important 
examples. How these can be generalized and still remain within the overall logit 
structure has been briefly presented in section 3.4. It could be useful ti find more 
general functional forms, including the logit as a special case, but allowing for 
different behaviors as well. 
A more general issue concerning the objective function is the relationship between 
the way the public facility location problem is posed and the economy of the 
country where it is posed. Although similar in the mathematical form, problems 
may have very different contents in this respect. The economic interpretation of 
benefits, for instance, can be some kind of consumer's surplus as has been done in 
this paper, thus implying the existence of prices. These are usually nonmonetary 
prices, expressed in terms of users' perceived utilities (or disutilities). This is implied 
in the random utility interpretation of models based on the logit-behavior assumption 
(see Neuburger, 1971; McFadden, l 974a; l 974b; Williams, 1977; and van Lierop 
and Nijkamp, 1979 among others). 
A closely related problem is whether public facilities should charge actual direct 
money prices to the consumers, that is, should they be profit-making, self-financing, 
or should they just exploit a given budget to maximize social benefit only. In this 
sense, having total cost in the objective function rather than in a budget constramt 
makes a difference, although the Lagrangian functions for the two problems look the 
same. 
A third important issue related to the objective function is the problem of 
empirically fitting the implied consumers' behavior models on actual data. This 
problem is shared by all the formulations where some kind of elastic or price sensitive 
demand is assumed, whether these models embed consumers' behavior by Neuburger's 
consumer surplus maximizing (thus producing standard spatial-interaction models), 
whether they have demand functions in terms of actual money prices, or whether 
they use any other theoretical approach. 
4.3 Form 
As previously stated, there are no really new problems as far as the mathematical 
form of a static location model is concerned. This is especially true for the classical 
(nonsensitive-demand) plant-location problems, for which a large amount of 
theoretical and computational work has been carried out, and reference can be made 
to very good existing state-of-the-art and bibliographical works on that topic (see 
ReVelle et al, 1970; and Lea, 1979, for instance). 
There are, however, some technical problems to be solved for the more general 
models discussed in sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2, and 3.4, which incidently, turn out to be 
the most interesting and useful ones in my opinion. They are listed and briefly 
discussed below: 
(a) Nonconcavity and uniqueness problems. Unfortunately, the benefit function (to 
be maximized) is usually concave<3>, and the cost functions are also concave. This 
results in a nonconcave programming problem, whose solution may not be unique 
(and usually it is not) and whose Kuhn-Tucker points need not be optimal ones. 
Some existence and uniqueness work could be useful, both for the general model 
and for its versions assuming meaningful special structures. 
(b) Dual formulation and analysis. The development of the duals of the general 
nonlinear models should be carried out in order to fully explore their properties. 
<3> If the problem is formulated in terms of cost minimizing, the users' cost function is usually 
convex, whereas the cost functions in the budget constraint are concave. Tilis results in a non-
convex programming problem. 
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This should give not only mathematical insight and computational hints, but also 
better physical and economic interpretations. 
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(c) Exploitation of special structures. Provided enough flexibility is preserved, some 
meaningful special structures should be introduced in the general functions, both in 
the objective function and in the budget constraint. 'Entropy' terms and power 
functions are an example (which has to be fully analyzed as yet). Some effort 
should be made towards finding other useful functional forms for users' benefits, or 
costs (other than the entropy form), as well as other functional forms which can best 
model the scale-economies' effect. Anyway, the theoretical work on special structures 
should be carriea out in close conjunction with the empirical work of fitting actual 
data to users' behavior (as discussed in section 4.2). 
4.4 Issues for further research 
The main conclusion which can be drawn from sections 2 and 3 is that some model-
building work is needed to account for some important features of real facility 
location problems. 
The question of demand sensitiveness to accessibility and congestion is the new 
leading descriptive issue. The unsatisfactory state of the theory and the relevance in 
applications ask for the development of new effective approaches to this issue. It is 
therefore proposed as one of the next steps in research on public facility location. 
The problem of finding exact and approximate solution techniques to the newly 
posed location problems is the leading applied issue. Expected results in this direction 
are outlined below: 
(I) Efficient ways of handling nonlinear objective functions (based on the spatial-
interaction embedding approach). 
(2) Efficient procedures to cope with nonsmooth features arising from real problems 
(such as fixeci charges, bounds on feasible sizes, and indivisibilities); 
(3) Computational schemes to analyze sensitivity of locational patterns to benefit/cost 
trade-off changes and travel cost changes. A comparative analysis of numerical 
results with some real cases will be carried out, in order to test the procedures and 
techniques outlined above. 
The problem of modeling new dimensions in location problems, like those in 
multilevel multiactivity and multistage (dynamic) systems, is the main new theoretical 
issue. It will also be of great applied value, since multiactivity dynamic models are 
the best ones suited for real urban service systems. A promising contribution along 
these lines should be the development of a set of spatial-interaction based indicators, 
monitoring the changes in the system and pointing out management policies (including 
capacity expansion, demolition, and relocation) for the stocks of urban service 
facilities. Of course, this development is not a short-term one, and it also tends to 
stretch the boundaries of the Public Facilities Location Task. It is felt therefore, 
that the development of these approaches will lead to suggestions for new inter-
disciplinary research on urban systems, which it is hoped will be useful for possible 
future tasks within an urban management theme. 
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